University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Articles

Faculty Publications and Presentations

2010

Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative
Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the
Charitable Deduction
Shannon Weeks McCormack
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities
Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977 (2010),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/820

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Presentations at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

TAKING THE GOOD WITH THE BAD:
RECOGNIZING THE NEGATIVE
EXTERNALITIES CREATED BY CHARITIES
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION
Shannon Weeks McCormack*

The tax code allows taxpayers to deduct amounts donated to an extremely broad
variety of organizations deemed to create societal benefits-that is, positive
externalities. But many organizations that may receive tax-deductible
contributions also cause harms. Both the tax code and subsidy theory, one of the
most utilized scholarly theories developed to analyze the deduction from an
economic and morally neutral perspective, fail to properly account for these
negative externalities. In order to do so, one needs to look beyond the economic
models utilized by subsidy theorists. Forinstance, there should be some limit to the
types of harms organizationscan cause while retainingtheir subsidy (that is, their
ability to receive deductible contributions), something not adequately provided by
the tax laws or the Kaldor-Hicks model used by subsidy theorists. As a starting
point, this Article suggests the government should not subsidize organizationsthat
impinge on an individual's ability to live a full and meaningful life as a fair and
equal member of society. If this (or some version of this) principle is accepted,
taxpayers should not be able to deduct amounts donated to organizations that do
so. Additionally, the government should not subsidize the efforts of organizations
to promote their views of societal issues upon which there is reasonable
disagreement. If one accepts this principle, donors should not be able to deduct
amounts given to organizations advancing any particular conception of "the
*
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good, "since allowance of the deduction would result in disparatesubsidization of
certain competing viewpoints over others, often favoring the majority view. If one
applies these suggested principles, it seems clear that the current law's
disallowance of deductions made to lobbying organizations and to certain
organizationswhich have race-basedexclusion policies is appropriate.However,
an application of these same principles would question whether the deduction is
appropriate in other situations in which it is currently allowed For instance,
current law allows donors to deduct amounts contributed to certain tax-exempt
organizations that engage in limited lobbying; to organizations that are sibling
organizations of lobbying groups, which seek to change public opinion through
educational efforts; and to groups that have exclusion policies based on criteria
other than race. An applicationof the suggested principlescreates questions as to
whether this is appropriate. This Article aims to act as a startingpoint to stimulate
further discussion about whether and to what extent donors should be able to
deduct amounts donated to charities that not only provide societal benefits but also
cause harm.
INTRODUCTION
Since 1917, taxpayers have been entitled to claim charitable
deductions' -that is, to deduct amounts contributed to "charitable institutions,"
thereby reducing their taxable income.2 Despite historical staying power, the
underlying policy justification for the charitable deduction is not clear. 3 Indeed,

1.

CHARLES

T. CLOTFELTER,

FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVNG 11

(1985) (stating that the government enacted the deduction for individual contributions to
eligible organizations in 1917); Chauncey Belknap, The FederalIncome Tax Exemption of
Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in COMM'N ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY & PUn. NEEDS,

4 RESEARCH

PAP'ERS: T~xxEs

2025, 2026 (1977) (explaining

that the government enacted the charitable deduction in 1917); Charles T. Clotfelter & C.

Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How

TAxEs AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

403, 403 (Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman eds., 1981) (same). The deduction enacted
in 1917 was limited to 15% of a taxpayer's gross income. Belknap, supra, at 2026.
2.
Section 170(c) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code defines the term
"charitable contribution" as a "contribution or gift to or for the use of' qualifying
organizations. I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2010). Section 501 (c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code defines tax-exempt charitable organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010). See

generally Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction,
42 B.C. L. REv. 843, 848-56 (2001) (providing an overview of the history of the charitable

contribution deduction); Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable ContributionsDeduction: A
Historical Review and a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1056, 1061-70 (2003)
(discussing the legislative history of section 170).

3.
See generally Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions
Deduction, 74 VA. L. REv. 1393 (1988) (discussing why a charitable contributions
deduction should exist and examining various theories that explain the rationale for this

deduction); Mark G. Kelman, PersonalDeductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an
"Ideal"Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a FarFrom Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV.
831 (1979) (commenting on Professor William Andrews's analysis of the charitable
contribution deduction); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal
Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679 (1988) (summarizing scholarship regarding personal
deductions).
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there is much debate on the subject. 4 Scholars have long toiled with the question of
why and under what circumstances taxpayers should be entitled to the deduction,
and have developed various theories to answer this question.5
In order to properly address this problem, it is important to see what the
deduction accomplishes. Assume a taxpayer donates $100 to an organization that
entitles her to deduct that amount from her otherwise taxable income. If she is in a
30% tax bracket, the $100 deduction, which reduces her income by that same
amount, has a value of $30, meaning her $100 donation only costs her $70 aftertax.
From this simple example, one can see that the charitable deduction
provides an incentive to taxpayers to make donations to institutions that enable
them to claim the deduction. Because the deduction lowers the after-tax cost of the
donation, taxpayers will donate more than they would have otherwise donated.6
Further, one can see that by granting this deduction the government
provides a subsidy to the organization to which the donated money has been paid.
In the example provided, the taxpayer received a $30 deduction-thus, the
taxpayer paid $70 to the organization of her choosing and the government
subsidized the remaining $30. The charitable deduction is economically equivalent
to the government providing a direct payment to the organization that the taxpayer
selected,7 and the government should, therefore, not grant charitable deductions in
cases where direct subsidies would be deemed inappropriate.8
4.
See John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 657, 659 (2001) ("Academic interest in the topic has been equally

significant. Much has been written over the past three decades about the section 170
deduction.").
5.
Various scholars have examined the even more general question of when the
government should grant taxpayers deductions for expenditures that are personal in nature,
as opposed to those associated with a business or profit-making activity, and they have
applied relevant concepts to the specific question of when a charitable deduction should be
granted. See generally William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,
86 HA.Iv. L. Rcv. 309 (1979) (discussing an ideal personal income tax, the medical expense
deduction, the charitable contribution deduction, and the implications of this analysis for
other aspects of personal income taxation); Kelman, supra note 3 (commenting on Professor
Andrews's analysis of personal deductions and the charitable deduction).
6.
Indeed, legislative history suggests that the creation of this incentive was the
explicit point of enacting the deduction. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
7.
See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L.
Riw. 705, 706 (1970). The deduction is just one of many ways in which the government can
provide financial assistance to organizations. Rather than incentivizing certain behaviors
through a deduction, the government could provide a direct expenditure, such as a direct
grant or a subsidy. There are indeed many other types of direct expenditure programs, such
as "loans, interest subsidies, guarantees of loan repayment or interest payments, [and]
insurance on investments." Id at 713. For any provided tax incentive, one could construct a
direct expenditure program with the same economic effect. For instance, rather than
providing taxpayers a deduction from taxable income for amounts donated to charity, the
government could match such amounts by giving grants equal to a proportionate amount of
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With these concepts in mind, one can turn to the essential question: what
sorts of organizations should the government subsidize by allowing taxpayers to
deduct amounts donated to them?
Currently, taxpayers may deduct amounts donated to organizations that
meet the requirements set forth. in section 170(c). 9 In order to qualify under this
section, the organization must have one of the listed purposes deemed to create
societal benefits. These purposes are broad, leading to a rapid proliferation of
organizations to which taxpayers may make deductible contributions.' 0 Further,
the donation. See id at 714 ("The existing tax incentive for charitable giving could also be
structured as a direct expenditure program, under which the Government would match an
individual's contribution to charity with a proportional contribution of its own to the same
charity."). Assume that Taxpayer A is in a 30% tax bracket, and donates $100 to an
organization in a manmer that qualifies for the charitable deduction. Taxpayer A claims a
deduction worth $30. Under a direct expenditure program, the government could instead
offer to pay $30 for every $70 donation, thereby achieving the same effect.
8.
Once one properly views the charitable deduction as one version of an
organizational subsidy, it is clear that tax deductions should meet the same criteria as direct
expenditures and should be limited in a similar manner. See id at 726 ("[W]hatever degree
of scrutiny and care should be applied to direct expenditures should also be applied to tax
incentives [such as the charitable deduction]."). Professor Surrey defines tax expenditures or
tax incentives as follows: unless the charitable deduction is a necessary adjustment to the
income tax base it constitutes a "tax expenditure." Id. at 724. Professor Surrey explains this
term as follows:
The term "tax expenditure" has been used to describe those special
provisions of the federal income tax system which represent government
expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and
economic objectives. These special provisions provide deductions,
credits, exclusions, exemptions, deferrals, and preferential rates, and
serve ends similar in nature to those served by direct government
expenditures or loan programs.
Id at 706.
Professor Surrey further states:
A government that decides it is wise to pay out tax credit money via a
simple tax schedule would be highly irrational if it also decided that it
would be unwise to pay the same amount directly on the same basis. A
dollar is a dollar-both for the person who receives it and the
government that pays it, whether the dollar comes with a tax credit label
or a direct expenditure label.
Id at 717.
9.
I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2010); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as
amended in 2008).
10.
The number of tax-exempt organizations to which taxpayers may make
deductible contributions is rapidly increasing. A recent article reported that "[tlhe number of
organizations that can offer their donors a tax break in the name of charity has grown more
than 60 percent in the United States, to 1.1 million," in the last decade. Stephanie Strom,
Charities Rise, Costing US. Billions in Tax Breaks, N.Y. TImEs, Dec. 6, 2009, at Al. It was
estimated that "[tlhe $300 billion donated to charities last year cost the federal government
more than $50 billion in lost tax revenue." Id Further, with nothing more concrete than the
language in section 501(c)(3), there is no principled way under current law for the IRS to
curb this trend. A recent study showed that the IRS approved more than 98% of applications

filed by organizations seeking tax-exempt status.

ROB REICH ET AL., STANFORD UNIV. CTR.
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these requirements fail to account for the fact that charities, while performing
designated functions deemed to create positive societal benefits (positive
externalities), may also cause harm (negative externalities). More rational
limitations are therefore needed.
Subsidy theory is one of the most utilized theories offered to analyze the
charitable deduction from an economic, morally neutral perspective and to provide
further limitations on the deduction. While a usefuil starting point for analyzing the
deduction, this Article will show that even this theory fails to properly account for
important situations in which charities cause negative externalities, suggesting that
additional factors must be developed.
Part I discusses the basic framework developed by subsidy theorists to
determine when a deduction for personal expenditures, such as the charitable
deduction, is justified." The theory posits that a deduction for charitable
expenditures is needed to encourage giving that would not occur in its absence.
According to subsidy theory, a deduction should not be granted unless three
conditions are met: (1) the donation is given to an organization that produces a
public good; (2) the public good would be underfunded in the absence of the
deduction; and (3) the transfer from the donor-taxpayer to the donee-organization
is efficient.'12 After presenting the general notions behind each of subsidy theory's
three criteria, Part 11 will focus on the efficiency prong. An analysis of the
underfunding prong will be reserved for a future article.
In considering the efficiency prong, subsidy theorists generally discuss
two common models of efficiency: the Pareto model and the Kaldor-Hicks model.
A transfer is said to be Pareto efficient if the transfer would "make at least one

person better off and no one worse

off",'3

This seems to provide an ideal measure

for determining whether a charitable deduction is warranted as it ensures that
taxpayers will not be harmed by governmentally provided funds. It will, however,
always be the case that some parties will be harmed to some extent when a taxdeductible donation is made. At the very least, because the cost of the deduction
will be spread among all taxpayers, some segment of society will always suffer
what this Article calls "universal subsidization harm." As a result of the
inevitability of some harm, disallowing deductions for all transfers that are not
Pareto efficient would eviscerate the deduction.
Subsidy theorists, therefore, use the Kaldor-HiEcks model as an alternative
measure that would prevent this result but still allow efficiency to be considered. A
transfer will be deemed Kaldor-Hicks efficient if the net benefits of the donation
exceed the resulting harms. Thus, roughly, one would identifyi the group benefitted
Soc'y, ANYTHING GOES: APPROVAL OF NONPROFIT STATUS BY
IRS
9
(2009),
available
at
http://www.stanford.edu/-sdsachs/
AnythingGoesPACS I109.pdf.
11.
See infraPart. A.
12.
In this way, the deduction will enable political minorities to overcome
collective action problems to better fund public goods that might be underfuinded if support
depended on the political sphere. Gergen, supra note 3, at 1399.
ON PHILANTHROPY AND) CIVIL
THE

13.

ECONOMICS

ANTHONY BARNES ATKINSON

&

JOSEPH

E.

STIGLITz, LECTURES ON PUBLIC

337 (1980); see also Gergen, supra note 3, at 1401.
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by the donations and the group harmed by the donations, and so long as the former
group benefitted more than the latter group was harmed, the transfer would be
deemed efficient and a deduction would be warranted under the efficiency prong.
Scholarship has not directly considered whether the efficiency criteria,
once applied, can sensibly separate transfers that should and should not receive a
charitable deduction. While the Kaldor-Hicks model provides a useful starting
point for analyzing the charitable deduction, this Article argues that the model
does not always yield results that are appropriate in assessing whether a charitable
deduction should be allowed for a particular transfer. Subsidy theorists make
certain assumptions about the nature of the harm suffered by the harmed group.
Specifically, they assume the harm of subsidizing a charity is limited to the
universal subsidization harm and the psychic harm one suffers from living in a
world in which others may deduct amounts donated to organizations one views as
foolish or strange.'14 In economic terms, the harmed group is assumed to be
relatively indifferent."5
Like the tax code, this fails to recognize that charities, in addition to
supposedly creating positive externalities, may also create rather profound
negative externalities. In light of this, even scholars of subsidy theory have failed
to focus on how to analyze the case for a charitable deduction when the doneeorganization has caused harms beyond those assumed.
To illustrate this gap, Part 11 starts with the case assumed by subsidytheory scholars where the group harmed by a donation is confined to relatively
indifferent parties-that is, harm is confined to slight psychic harms and universal
subsidization harm. As shown, it will generally be rather easy for these transfers to
meet the efficiency prong of the subsidy analysis, and it seems appropriate to allow
charitable deductions in these cases, as long as the other prongs of the theory are
satisfied.
Part 11 then relaxes these assumptions and presents several cases where
the harm caused by donee-organizations is not limited in the assumed manner.
These cases show that the Kaldor-Hicks model is not sufficient to determine
whether taxpayers should receive a charitable deduction for amounts donated to
these organizations. Having exposed this gap, this Article provides preliminary
suggestions as to how it might be filled.
First, there should be some limit to the types of harm that the government
should subsidize. The Kaldor-Hicks model does not adequately provide this limit.
As a starting point, this Article suggests that the government should not subsidize
behavior that impinges on any individual's ability to live a full and meaningful
life'16 as a free and equal member of society.'17 If this principle is accepted, the law
14.
See Gergen, supra note 3, at 1400-06, 1412.
15.
See generally id
16.
Political philosopher John Rawls states that a person should be able to "take
part in, or .. . play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights and
duties. Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and
RAWLS, POLITICAL
fully cooperating member of society over a complete life." JOHAN
LIBERALISM 18 (expanded ed. 2005). This (and the second preliminary principle described
below) is derived from Rawls's notions of a well-ordered democratic society. Id. This
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should not allow donors to deduct amounts donated to organizations that cause
such harm, even if the economic models would suggest that these transfers are

efficient.

18

Second, when there is a reasonable disagreement among the population as
to what is desirable, the government should not subsidize any one conception.
Thus, deductions should not be granted for amounts contributed to organizations
that advocate one particular conception of "the good." 19 Allowing the deduction
would always result in disparate subsidization of some positions over others, often
favoring the position advocated by groups with the largest support bases.
Current law complies with these principles only to a limited extent. For
instance, current law does not allow taxpayers to deduct amounts contributed to
educational and certain other organizations that have exclusion policies based on
race. This is in accord with the first principle because hindering one's ability to
participate in activities based on the color of one's skin impinges on a person's
ability to participate as a fair and equal member of society. However, the law
currently allows taxpayers to deduct amounts contributed to organizations with
exclusion policies based on criteria other than race, such as sexual orientation. This
violates the first principle, suggesting a deduction is inappropriate.
Further, the law currently disallows deductions for transfers to lobbying
organizations that strive to influence legislation. This accords with the second
suggested principle that the government should not subsidize any particular
conception of "the good" when there is a reasonable disagreement. However,
under current law, taxpayers may deduct donations to certain 501(c)(3)
organizations engaged in limited lobbying and to organizations that seek to change
public opinion about debated societal issues through educational efforts, as long as
there is no direct attempt to influence legislation. This runs afoul of the second
proposed principle, which suggests that allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts
donated to these organizations is inappropriate.

Article's usage of theses principles is by no means intended to make a philosophical
judgment as to whether these notions are appropriate as overall societal goals. The
principles were selected because they seem to provide a sensible "floor" for limiting the
harms that the goverrnent might subsidize and were particularly appropriate for analyzing
the types of negative externalities discussed inthis Article. These principles are used for the
narrow purpose of showing that, if the principles are accepted, certain organizations
currently able to receive deductible contributions should receive further scrutiny. More
appropriate articulations of these ideas may emerge in future discussions.
17.
A citizen is a "free and equal" person. Id at 19.
18.
Rawls believes that when there is a "plurality of reasonable doctrines"-that
is, when there are various non-reconcilable conceptions of "the good" all of which could be
believed by reasonable people-then "it is unreasonable or worse to want to use the
sanctions of state power to correct, or to punish those who disagree with as." Id at 138.
19.
Id.

984

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 52:977

1. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY Suesmvy THEORY:
A STARTING POINT
A popular justification for the charitable deduction is that it provides an
"incentive by which the tax law encourages desirable behavior.",2 0 Granting a
deduction for a particular donative action likely increases the reoccurrence of that
action because, all else equal, the cost to the taxpayer is reduced .2 1 Legislative
history supports this construction. The government enacted the charitable
deduction as part of the Second Revenue Act of 1917, which dramatically
increased tax rates from 7% to 5 1% in order to fund the United States' efforts in
World War 1.22 Senator Hollis stated:
It will work in this way: Usually people contribute to charities and
educational objects out of their surplus. After they have done
everything else they want to do, after they have educated their
children and traveled and spent their money on everything they
really want or think they want, then, if they have something left
over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red Cross or for
some scientific purposes. Now, when war comes and we impose
these very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the first place where
the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely, in
donations to charity. They will say, "Charity begins at home."2
Concerned that the increased tax burden would diminish people's
willingness (and perhaps ability) to make charitable donations, the deduction was
granted. Thus, legislative history explicitly indicates that the government enacted
the deduction because of its hoped incentive effects.

20.
CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at 280; see also RIUCHARD GOODE, THE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME T~.x 161 (rev. ed. 1976) (stating that the primary justification for the
philanthropic contributions deduction is "encouragement or reward of socially desirable
activity'); C. HARRY KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS INTHE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 13 (1960)
(noting that one of three reasons for personal deductions is the desire to provide an incentive
for certain expenditures and that the charitable deduction is usually justified on that
ground); Colombo, supra note 4, at 661 (stating that "existing literature surrounding the
section 170 deduction generally accepts the subsidization role of the deduction"); C. Eugene
Steuerle & Martin A. Sullivan, Toward More Simple and Effective Giving: Reforming the
Tax Rules for Charitable Contributionsand Charitable Organizations, 12 Am. J. TAX POL'Y
399, 403 (1995) (explaining that one of the two principal justifications for the charitable
deduction is that it provides a tax incentive for taxpayers to contribute to appropriate
causes).
21.
See Aprill, supra note 2, at 856 ("The assumption is that, because the
permitted deduction lowers the price of contribution, taxpayers will give more when the
price is lower.").
22.
See John A. Wallace & Robert W. Fisher, The CharitableDeduction Under
Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, in COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUn.
NEEDS, 4 RESEARCH PAPERS: TAxEs 2131-61 (1977); see also KAHN, supra note 20, at 4648 (discussing the legislative background of philanthropic contributions); Aprill, supra note
2, at 848-56 (providing an overview of the history of the charitable contribution deduction);
Lindsey, supra note 2, at 106 1-70 (same).
23.
55 CONG. REc. 6728 (1917) (statement of Senator Henry Hollis).
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It is essential to recognize the effects of this incentive mechanism. By
allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts given to organizations to which they have
chosen to donate, the government provides a subsidy to those organizations. 14The
charitable deduction is a unique method of providing the subsidy since it is the
taxpayer's action that triggers it, and it is the taxpayer who decides which
organizations to subsidize."5 Thus, there must be compelling reasons for allocating
public funds in this manner rather than having Congress allocate funds, as is
ordinarily done. The idea generally accepted by scholars has been explained in
various ways, but the basic tenet is that the deduction is essential to protect
minority interests.2 If Congress had the ability to implement the subsidies, only
those goods preferred by a majority of voters would be provided. 2 7 Scholars allege
that a tax deduction, as compared to a direct assistance plan (that is, a plan where
Congress selects which organizations to subsidize), is a better method to fund
charities because of its superior ability to prevent a so-called tyranny of the
majority and to promote pluralism.2 Under this reasoning, the deduction allows
taxpayers to choose the organizations to which they will donate, so even
organizations with small support bases are able to receive aid .2 9 A direct assistance
program, it is argued, would be poorly suited to preserve these goals.3 0 Scholars
fear that the list of funded organizations, as revised by politicians, would begin to
resemble the wish lists of large constituencies, leaving out smaller organizations
whose supporters cannot reward politicians with numerous votes. 3 1 In contrast,
deductions let each taxpayer vote with his or her own dollars, 3 2 allowing for the
formation of new groups that can fund minority projects. 3
With these goals in mind, the question is: what sorts of organizations
should the government subsidize by allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts donated
to them?
24.
See generally Surrey, supra note 7.
25.
See, e.g., Boris 1. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or
Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REv. 37, 45 (1972); Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U.
CHIl. L. REv. 387, 405 (1998). See generally Miranda Perry Fleischer, Generous to a Fault?
FairShares and Charitable Giving, 93 MINN. L. REv. 165 (2008).
26.
See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 25, at 46.
27.
See id. at 45-46.
28.
See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, CharitableContributions:A Policy Perspective, 50
Mo. L. REv. 85, 96 (1985) ("[T]he charitable contribution deduction encourages cultural and
associational pluralism."); see also Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary

Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT
INSTITUTIONS 21, 23-25, 36-37 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) (using an economic
model to suggest that government provision of nonprofit services will align with interests of
the majority of voters).
29.
Wiedenbeck, supra note 28, at 97.
30.
See Bittker, supra note 25, at 46 ("1 must say that I have very little
confidence that a system of matching grants could be administered without administrative
and congressional investigations, loyalty oaths, informal or implicit warnings against
heterodoxy and the other trappings of governmental support that the tax deduction has, so
far, been able to escape.").
Id.
31.
32.
Levmore, supra note 25.
33.
Fleischer, supra note 25, at 207-10.
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Currently, taxpayers may deduct amounts donated to organizations that
meet the criteria set forth in section 170(c).3 These organizations include those
that are "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
35
sports competition . .. or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."
This mirrors the language of section 501(c)(3), which provides that entities
organized and operated in this manner will not be subject to income taxation so
long as they meet the other requirements of that section.6
This definition is extremely broad and has led to the rapid proliferation of
37
organizations to which donors may make tax-deductible contributions.
Importantly, it fails to account in any way for the harms that charities might cause.
In light of this, more rational limitations on the types of organizations to which
donors may make deductible contributions are needed.
Subsidy theory is one of the most utilized theories to provide these
additional limits by offering an economic, morally neutral model for analyzing the
deduction. Scholars of subsidy theory maintain that the government should provide
a deduction for donated amounts only when needed to encourage desirable giving
that would not occur in its absence. 3 8 Subsidy theorists deem this goal fulfilled,
and a deduction justified, if three conditions are met .3 9 First, the organization to
which the donation is made must provide a public good.4 Second, the public good
must be one that would be underfunded or sub-optimally provided in the absence
of a deduction .4 '1 Third, the transfer from donor-taxpayer to donee-organization
must be efficiency enhancing from an overall societal perspective.4 When these
criteria are met, subsidy theorists argue that the deduction will allow political
minorities to surmount free-rider problems in order to optimally fund goods that

34.
35.
36.
follows:

I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2010).
Id. § 170(c)(2)(B).
Id § 501(c)(3). The regulations explicate the meaning of charitable as

The term charitable is used. ...
in its generally accepted legal sense ...
[It] includes: [flelief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science; erection
or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the
burdens of [g]overnment; . .. lessen[ing] neighborhood tensions;..
eliminat[ing] prejudice and discrimination; .. . defend[ing] human and
civil rights secured by law; [and] combat[ing] community deterioration
and juvenile delinquency.
Treas. Reg. § 1.50 l(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008).
37.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
38.
See generally Johnny Rex Buckles, The Case for the Taxpaying Good
Samaritan: Deducting Earmarked Transfers to Charity Under Federal Income Tax Law,
Theory and Policy, 70 FORDHAmV L. REv. 1243, 1285-88 (2002) (explaining subsidy theory
through observations of its proponents); Gergen, supra note 3, at 1396-1414 (discussing
basic concepts of subsidy theory and refinements); Lindsey, supra note 2 (same).
See Gergen, supra note 3, at 1396-1406.
39.
40.
See id
41.
See id
42.
See id
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would otherwise be sub-optimally provided.4 This, therefore, accords with the
minority-protecting and pluralistic goals at the heart of the deduction's
justification.
Before further explaining these criteria, it is important to note how this
discussion relates to so-called tax-base theories, another line of thought regarding
personal deductions, such as the charitable deduction. Subsidy theory seeks to
answer the following question: under what circumstances can the govemnment
justifyi giving federal money in the form of a tax deduction for expenditures that
would otherwise be part of the tax base? Put another way, subsidy theory seeks to
determine when the government ought to grant deductions for taxpayer
expenditures (for example, charitable giving). One can use subsidy theory only
after one has concluded or assumed that the deduction is not a needed adjustment
to taxpayer income that is necessary to properly calculate the income tax base,
however defined."
For instance, subsidy theory is an inapp ropriate model to analyze whether
the law should permit taxpayers to deduct business expenses from gross income
45

because the current tax system seeks to tax net (as opposed to gross)

profits.

Deduction of business expenditures is, therefore, a necessary adjustment to the
income tax base, as currently defined, making the subsidy theory unneeded.
It is not always so easy to determine what constitutes a necessary
adjustment to the tax base. Indeed, the law does not define other aspects of the tax
base as clearly as in the above example, making the inquiry more complicated. For
instance, knowing that the tax base is meant to tax net rather than gross profits
does not help answer whether a deduction for donations made to charitable
organizations (however defined) constitutes a necessary adjustment to taxpayer
income. This requires closer analysis of what constitutes the current tax base, a
definitional inquiry that proves difficult.
Notable scholars have toiled with this question, seeking to provide a
comprehensive definition of "income" for purposes of determining the proper

43.

Id. at 1397-1400.

See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 5, at 311-12. Professor Andrews discusses the
way in which subsidy theory and tax-base theories interrelate. He explains that before
concluding a deduction is equivalent to a direct expenditure such that subsidy theory should
44.

apply, it is:
imperative to consider carefully whether a provision can be defended by
reference to intrinsic matters of tax policy before evaluating it as if it
were something else. The tax expenditure analysis itself does not lead us
to focus on that question because characterization as a tax expenditure
and analogy to a direct expenditure generally imply that the provision
serves purposes outside those of the tax system.
Id. at 312; see also Surrey, supra note 7, at 706 (explaining that classify'ing expenditures as
equivalent to direct expenditures "involves a major definitional question: which tax rules
are special provisions and therefore tax expenditures, and which tax rules are just tax
rules[,] simply part of the warp and woof of a tax structure?").
See L.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2010).
45.
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income tax base .46 Such scholars, developing and focusing on tax-base theories,
evaluate the appropriateness of personal deductions, such as those for charitable
giving, by asking whether it is an appropriate exclusion from the tax base-if it
embodies "the intrinsic objectives of the [income] tax. ,47 In doing so, scholars
disagree on the proper definition of income to be used in calculating the income
tax base.4 Further, even when scholars agree upon a definition, they disagree as to
whether and to what extent personal expenditures such as charitable donations
49
necessitate a deduction, often resulting in intense interchanges.
This Article does not endeavor to reconcile these difficult issues.5
However, it is important to recognize the implications of tax-base theories as they
relate to subsidy theory and the Article's analysis. If a charitable deduction is
needed to properly calculate the tax base, subsidy theory's analysis would become
immaterial .5 1 Thus, to the extent a particular deduction is unwarranted under
subsidy analysis, it may still potentially be warranted under one or several tax-base
theories.
Despite this, an inquiry into subsidy theory remains essential, especially
when one considers the ongoing nature of the disagreements associated with taxbase theories. If the caliber of scholars who have, to date, failed to come to an
agreement serves as an indication, then the discussion of what constitutes a proper
46.
See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 20, at 13-17 (analyzing the definition of income
in the context of income as a tax base); Andrews, supra note 5, at 318-25 (discussing the
meaning of personal income); Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the
Charitable Contributions Deduction, 80 1ID. L.J. 947, 953 (2005) (noting that "a proper
conception of 'income' is of utmost importance to the debate on the legitimacy of the
charitable contributions deduction"). See generally Koppelman, supra note 3 (summarizing
various tax-base theories).
Andrews, supra note 5, at 312.
47.
See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 46, at 954-61 (discussing the uncertain
48.
meaning of income); Koppelman, supra note 3, at 687 ("The uncertain role of personal
deductions reflects an underlying uncertainty about the meaning of income as a base for
personal taxation. ideed, the divergent views on personal deductions may be traced to
differing perspectives on the meaning of income.").
49.
For such an interchange, see Andrews, supra note 5, at 309-17, in which
Andrews provides a formulation of income and argues this formulation requires that
charitable donations be deductible. Then, for vigorous commentary disagreeing with
Professor Andrews's formulation, see, for example, Kelman, supra note 3, at 838, and
Koppelman, supra note 3, at 687-705. See also Buckles, supra note 46, at 958 ("Not all
students of Henry Simons embrace the justification for the charitable contributions
deduction advanced by Professor Andrews. Chief among Andrews's critics are Professors
Mark Kelman and Stanley Koppelman.").
50.
For an excellent discussion of various tax-base theories, see Koppelman,
supra note 3, at 967-75. See generally Buckles, supra note 46 (focusing on tax-base
theories in support of the charitable contributions deduction).
51.
CLOTFELTER, supra note 1, at 280 ("If the deduction is seen as an absolutely
necessary adjustment to income, it becomes 'a matter of principle,' and there remains little
to discuss concerning the proper tax treatment of charitable giving." (quoting George F.
Break, Charitable Contributions Under the Federal Individual Income Tax. Alternative
Policy Options, in COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, 3 RESEARCH PAPERS:
SPECIAL BEHAVIORAL STUDIES, FOUNDATIONS, AND CORP'ORATIONS

1521, 1530 (1977))).
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definition of income, and whether the charitable deduction can be justified under
any chosen definition, is unlikely to be soon resolved. As a result, it is useful to
inquire how subsidy theory fares if one assumes the charitable deduction is not a
necessary adjustment to the tax base. The remainder of this Article makes this
assumption.
This Part will now discuss the three prongs of subsidy theory's analysisnamely, that a deduction is justified if the organization to which the donation is
made provides a public good, if the public good would be underfunded or suboptimally provided in the absence of a deduction, and if the transfer from the
donor-taxpayer to the donee-organization is efficiency enhancing from an overall
societal perspective.5
A. (Quasi-) Public or Collective Goods
Scholars of subsidy theory assert that taxpayers

should receive a

charitable deduction only for amounts given to organizations that provide public
goods.5 As an economic concept, a public good, also known and referred to
interchangeably as a collective good, refers to a good with the properties of "nonrivairous consumption" and "non-excludability." 54 Non-rivalrous consumption
describes a good that is in "joint supply, [such that] one person's consumption of it
does not reduce the amount available to anyone else." 55 Non-excludability means
that individuals cannot practically be prevented from consuming the good.5 A

52.
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1396-1406.
53.
See Andrews, supra note 5, at 357 (explaining that the basis for arguments in
favor of the deduction is the fact that most charitable organizations produce "something in
the nature of common or social goods or services"); Andrew Chamberlain & Mark
Sussman, Charities and Public Goods: The Case for Reforming the Federal Income Tax
Deduction for Charitable Gifts, TAX FOUND. SPECIAL REP. No. 137, at 3 (Nov. 2005)
(arguing that the economic justification for the tax subsidy to charities requires qualified
charities to produce public goods); Gergen, supra note 3, at 1397-98 (stating that "[tlhe
starting point of the subsidy theory is the observation that charities provide public goods
which we wish to have provided without charge to their beneficiaries"); see also HERBERT
KIESLING, TAXATION AND PUBLIC GooDs 201

-02 (1934).

54.
Chamberlain & Sussman, supra note 53, at 2; see also KIESLING, supra note
53, at 9-12 (providing a comprehensive definition of public goods and emphasizing the
demand characteristic and the fact of common supply).

55.

See

RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION

17 (1982); see also Chamberlain

& Sussman, supra note 53, at 2 (stating that "non-rivairous consumption," in plain
language, means one individual's use does not reduce the amount of the good left for
others); Gergen, supra note 3, at 1397 (explaining that when one individual's consumption
of a public good does not reduce its availability to other individuals, then the good is
"nonrival or in joint supply").
56.
See HARDIN, supra note 55, at 17 ("It is impossible to prevent relevant
people from consuming [a pure public good]."); Chamberlain & Sussman, supra note 53, at
2 (defining "non-excludability" as meaning that people who do not pay to consume the
good cannot be prevented from using the good); Gergen, supra note 3, at 1397 (explaining
that if no one can exclude another from a good, then it is non-exclusive).
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lighthouse, for example, is a quintessential public good.5 One's supply of usable
light is in no way affected by others' use, and thus a lighthouse possesses the
property of non-rivalrous consumption .5 8 A lighthouse also illustrates nonexcludability because no one can reasonably prevent another individual in its
59
sightline from viewing its light.

Pure public goods that are truly non-rivairous and non-excludable are
rare. 60 Even air supply fails to fall squarely within the definition: "if enough people
consume it in various ways, what is left for others to use is greatly altered.",6 ' Thus,
in determining to what types of organizations the law should encourage taxpayer
contributions, the focus must turn to provision of quasi-public goods-that is, to
organizations providing goods that are "similar to public goods over some
62
range."
It is beyond the scope of this Article to define whether a particular good
is "public enough" to allow organizations providing it to receive deductible
contributions. Indeed, many, if not most, organizations that are currently able to
receive deductible contributions provide goods that may not meet the definition of
a pure public good.6 Consider an organization that provides medical research: the
additional knowledge accumulated through research seems non-rival because
application of that knowledge-to a particular 6Ratient, for example--does not
seem to preclude its application by or for others.6 It is less clear whether the nonexcludability requirement would be fulfilled, as patents or licensing arrangements
may exclude individuals fr~om using the medical advancements produced by
conducted research.6 Thus, although taxpayers may deduct amounts donated to

57.
See generally R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN.
357 (1974) (discussing the lighthouse example in the context of economics and public
goods).
58.
Id. at 359.
59.
Id.
60.
"[Me are left with the problem of reconciling ourselves to a neat definition
of collective goods that is apparently inapplicable to nearly all the familiar instances of
collective goods." H{ARDIN, supra note 55, at 18-19 (quoting E.T. Mishan, The Relationship
Between Joint Products, Collective Goods, and External Effects, 77 J. POL. EcoN. 329, 334
(1969)); see also Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism:A Critique,
50 VAND. L. REv. 1137, 1249 (1997) (stating that "'.pure' public goods that benefit all
national taxpayers equally ... are extremely rare"); John D. Colombo, Why is HarvardTaxExempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private EducationalInstitutions), 35
Aiz. L. REv. 841, 869 (1993) (explaining that pure public goods are rare, and most goods
and services are imperfect hybrids).
61.
HARDIN, supra note 55, at 17.
62.
Id. at 19.
63.
See Gergen, supra note 3, at 1397-99 (questioning the premise that goods
provided by certain tax exempt organization are truly public goods).
64.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
65.
See Chamberlain & Sussman, supra note 53. at 4 ("Neither hospitals nor
universities can plausibly be said to fit the economist's definition of public goods. Their
primary services are direct hospital care to patients, and research and direct classroom
instruction to students. Those who refuise to pay can easily be excluded from both, and one
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such organizations under current law, it is not clear that the goods provided by
medical research organizations meet the economic definition of a pure public
good.6
Current law also allows taxpayers to deduct amounts contributed to opera
halls and houses of worship.6 The goods produced by opera halls and houses of
worship suffer from the opposite defect. Even if these venues are open to all
interested, thereby eliminating exclusivity problems, the provision of opera
performances and religious services possess an element of rivalry when the
physical space provided for the performance or service reaches maximum

capacity. 6
While few organizations will actually provide pure public goods, it is
clear that donors should only be able to deduct amounts given to organizations that
provide goods which are different in character from purely non-public goods .6 For
example, a taxpayer should not receive a deduction for amounts spent to purchase
a meal for himself, as it is both rivalrous (once eaten, others cannot) and
excludable (the taxpayer can easily prevent others from consuming his meal),
falling clearly outside the definition of a public good.7 0 On the other hand, while
one probably thinks that a taxpayer should receive a deduction for amounts
donated to feeding the poor, the food provided will still not meet the pure
definition of a public good-once one person receives the aid, others cannot
receive it as it has been consumed.

person's consumption of them clearly reduces the amount left for others."); see also supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
See I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2010); see also Search for Charities, Online
66.
Version of Publication 78, INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., http://www.irs.gov/app/pub-78/ (click
"Search") (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (providing a cumulative list of organizations eligible
to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions); Chamberlain & Sussman, supra note 53,
at 5 (providing list of registered section 501 (c)(3) charities as of 2004).
See sources cited supra note 66.
67.
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
68.
Professor Mark Gergen conceptualizes the public good complexity as
69.
follows:
Disaster and poverty relief also may be considered close to pure public
goods if one emphasizes the benefits that accrue to society generallye.g., insurance, relieving knowledge of other people's suffering, or
easing potential social tension-and not the specific assistance given to
individuals or the specific pleasure donors obtain from giving. Churches,
museums, and schools are not public goods in this strict sense of the
term because they benefit parishioners, patrons, and students who could
be made to pay for what they receive. They may, however, be thought of
as impure public goods because of their secondary benefits. The moral or
intellectual education of parishioners and students indirectly benefits
everyone in the community, and the presence of churches, museums, and
schools makes a community a more stimulating and attractive place to
live for everyone.
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1397-98 (citation omitted).
See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
70.
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Thus, for purposes of this Article, one should view the public good
requirement as requiring organizations to provide goods that create enough
positive externalities that it makes sense to subsidize organizations providing
them, so long as they meet the other criteria of subsidy theory.
Organizations that provide food to the poor clearly create many positive
externalities by allowing those who could otherwise not provide for themselves to
receive nourishment essential to their survival. It thus seems taxpayers should
receive deductions for donations to organizations that provide these goods if other
criteria are fulfilled. Consider, however, another simple example where positive
externalities are created, but are not sufficient to warrant a deduction: an extremely
well-dressed woman. Positive externalities might arguably be created by, for
7
instance, making the places in which she travels more aesthetically appealing. '
Few, however, would contend that these positive externalities are great enough
that taxpayers should receive deductions for donating money to enhance her
wardrobe (or to an organization which performs the same task).7 In analyzing the
presented cases, the remainder of this Article will assume that the goods or
services provided by the organizations at issue fulfill this prong ,and will refer to
them as public goods.
Having illustrated the (quasi-) public good prong of the subsidy theory
analysis, this Article now turns to its second requirement.
B. Correcting Underfunding: Achieving Optimal Provision of Public Goods and
an Optimal Payment Pattern
Assuming the donee-organization provides a public good, subsidy theory
asserts that the government should not provide a subsidy in the form of a tax
deduction unless that public good would be underfunded in the absence of a
deduction .7 ' Thus, if the public good would not be underfunded in the absence of
the deduction, the subsidy ought not be provided.
This obviously requires one to define the circumstances under which a
particular public good will be optimally funded (that is, not be underfunded). To
this end, Professor Gergen employs the "benefits ,ricing model,"7 under which
optimal funding occurs if two conditions are met. 5 The first condition provides
that a public good should be "funded at the level where the sum of the incremental
71.
Negative externalities may also be created-for instance, people may be
distracted, the individual may cause feelings of envy, etc.-but this is not important for
purposes of making the point.
72.
Thank you to Mark Gergen for aiding me with this "eye candy" hypothetical.
73.
"Charities that provide goods for which we cannot or do not wish to charge
beneficiaries deserve government support because, without the subsidy, society will tend to
underfund them." Gergen, supra note 3, at 1398.
74.
Id. at 1400 (citing Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal
Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 30 NAT. TAX J. 1 (1977), reprinted in THE
EcoNoMIcs OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE

AND POLICY 224 (Susan

Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986)). The benefits pricing model is also referred to as the Lindahl

solution. Id

75.

See

ANDREw SCHOTTER, MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 641-42

(2009) (providing an overview of the Lindahl solution to the problem of public goods).
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benefits individuals derive from the last unit of the good equals the marginal cost
of that unit." 76 If funded at this level, the good is optimally provided. Second,
"each individual [should] contribute[] an amount equal to her marginal benefit

from the last unit of the good times the number of units provided.",77 If this
condition is satisfied, an optimal payment pattemn has been achieved.
Consider a simple example to illustrate the first condition. Assume that
Organization C will provide a public good, P. As a result, individual A will enjoy a
$5 benefit from the provision of one additional unit of P, and individual B will
enjoy a $2 benefit from the additional unit provided. Organization C should
provide that unit of the good so long as the cost of producing it is less than or equal
to $7 (the sum of the benefits enjoyed by A and B from that additional unit). Once
the marginal cost exceeds the aggregate benefits to A and B, however,
Organization C should no longer provide that unit.
Assume now that it costs Organization C $7 to produce Unit 1 of public
good P. A second unit (Unit 2) will also cost $7, and A and B will each derive an
additional $2 marginal benefit. The optimal level of provision is to provide Unit 1,
but not Unit 2. This will happen in a normal market scenario so long as A and B
are rational economic actors. A rational economic actor should see no difference
between receiving the good and retaining an amount of money equal to the benefit
enjoyed by that good. 78 Thus, absent transaction costs, a rational purchaser will
pay any amount that does not exceed the benefit the good can provide. 79 In this
example, if A and B are rational actors, A will pay $5 and B will pay $2 for Unit 1,
and each will pay $2 for Unit 2. Since Organization C can only cover its $7 cost
for Unit 1, only that unit will be produced, which is the optimal solution. Where,
as in this example, "each individual contributes an amount equal to her marginal
76.

Gergen, supra note 3, at 1400.

77.

Id.
See MICHAEL ANTHONY LEwis &KARL WIDERQUIST, ECONOMICS FOR SOCIAL
WORKERS: THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC THEORY TO SOCIAL POLICY AND THE HUMAN
SERVICES 16-24 (2002) (discussing marginal analysis within the assumption of rational selfinterested behavior). Explaining marginal analysis, economists Lewis and Widerquist state
that "the optimal quantity is the point at which the marginal cost equals the marginal
benefit." Id at 2 1. They provide the following example:
If a cookie costs $ 1, then for every cookie I eat, I have one less dollar to
spend on all other goods. The marginal benefit of a cookie is a little bit
trickier. You have to ask yourself how much you would pay for this
cookie. What would be the most I would give up for this cookie if I had
to? Suppose you eat one cookie and it tastes so good that you would be
willing to sacrifice $4 worth of other goods to buy it. . .. Luckily, you
had to pay only $ 1, so it was a good deal for you. So you have another.
Now that you have already had a cookie, the second one is not nearly so
satisfying, but it is still good-so you would pay $2 for it. Still a good
deal. Now that you are becoming satisfied, the third cookie is only worth
$1 to you. It costs $1 so it is worth it, but just barely. You are indifferent
to this third unit. That is how you know you have reached the optimum,
and it is time to stop eating cookies.
Id. at 22.

78.

79.

Id.
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benefit from the [goods provided] ,,,O an optimal payment pattemn also exists,
satisfying the second condition of the benefits pricing model.
However, suppose that either A or B is no longer willing to pay an
amount equal to the benefit derived from the good. The good will be underfunded,
as it cannot be provided at the optimal level. The producer will not provide Unit I
because it will not be able to cover the costs of production. This illustrates a
collective action problem.
Providing a tax deduction may correct this collective action problem by
creating conditions that restore optimal provision of the collective good. Assume
that A is still willing to pay $5 for Unit 1 of P, but B is not willing to pay anything,
even though he will benefit $2 from Unit I's provision. Organization C will not
provide the additional unit of P because its costs cannot be covered. But now
assume that a taxpayer may receive a deduction for amounts spent on the public
good. If A is granted a deduction that is worth $2 81on amounts expended on P, the
optimal level of production will be restored. Taxpayer A will give $7 to
Organization C, as the good will have an after-tax cost of $5 ($7 minus $2), the
amount A is willing to spend. Organization C will be able to cover its costs, and
Unit 1 will be provided. In this way, optimal provision is restored.
Further, in this scenario, assuming that A and B are the only two
taxpayers in a finite universe, an optimal payment pattern is again achieved, as
both A and B can be said to have paid an amount equal to their marginal benefit
from Unit 1. Specifically, A paid $5 after tax, an amount equal to his marginal
benefit from Unit 1, and B can be said to have paid $2, an amount equal to his
marginal benefit from that unit, by bearing the costs of A's tax savings. Here, the
deduction seems entirely defensible, as nobody paid more than the benefit received
82
from the provision of the good.
The framework presented provides an essential starting point by showing
how the charitable deduction can correct collective action problems, thereby
correcting the underfunding that results. There are various reasons why a collective
action problem of this nature might occur, and often does occur, particularly in the
context of collective goods where donations fuind production. For instance,
suppose an organization in Smalltown wishes to raise money to build a community
center for its 100,000 citizens. The center will cost $100,000. A group of fifty
citizens will have a large $1000 benefit from the center and the remainder of the
citizenry will reap small individual benefits of $1 each. If each citizen contributes
an amount equal to his or her individual benefit, the organization will build the
center because costs will be covered (that is, the aggregate benefit of $149,950
80.
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1400.
For instance, if an individual is in a 33% tax bracket, a $7 deduction would
81.
be worth just over $2.
The astute observer might ask how, if A and B are the only members of a
82.
democratic society, a deduction could be passed over B's objection (he is not willing to pay
for the good, and therefore will not be willing to pay for the deduction). The backscratching scheme suggested by Colombo and Hall suggests a solution to this political
action problem. See JOHN~ D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAx
EXEMPTION 107-08 (1995).
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outweighs the $100,000 cost). However, there are many reasons why citizensparticularly those citizens reaping a small benefit-may not, and often do not,
contribute this amount. To cite a common example, there may be a free-r ider
problem whereby citizens do not pay the rational price (their individual benefit)
because they hope that others will fund the project, allowing the free-riding
citizens to reap benefits without bearing any cost. 8 3 Those citizens that only reap a
small individual benefit may be especially likely to free-ride, as the project is not
of particular importance to them.
In this case, the deduction might "enable[] people with a high preference
for a good [here, the fifty citizens reaping a large benefit] to shift some of its cost
to low-preference freeriders [here, the remaining citizens who reap small
benefits] , 84 who would, were they not free-riding, pay an amount equal to the
benefit derived. In this way, subsidy theory promotes the minority-protecting and
pluralistic notions used to justify the deduction by enabling political minorities to
overcome collective action problems, thus funding projects that would not
otherwise be funded in the political sphere (because politicians would cater to
majority interests). In this example, the fifty citizens who would reap the greatest
benefits from the center would likely not have the political power to convince
lawmakers to fund the project. The remaining majority of citizens who would only
receive small benefits would be unlikely to devote energy toward advocating the
project's constr-uction. As shown, however, the cost-shifting mechanism provided
by the deduction, and advocated by subsidy theory, might allow this minority
project to be funded.
Having discussed the public good and underfunding prongs of subsidy
theory, the next Section will discuss the remaining efficiency prong of the analysis,
which will be the focus of the remainder of this Article.
C Overall Efficiency
Thus far, it has been stated that a deduction for amounts given to an
organization can be justified if, and only if, the organization provides a public
good that is underfunded-that is, in the absence of a deduction, individuals will
not contribute enough money for the good to be optimally provided. In calculating
the optimal provision level, marginal benefits were weighed against marginal
costs. In calculating marginal benefits, one summed the benefits enjoyed by those
who ultimately used the good and, in calculating marginal costs, one summed all
costs associated with producing the good. The calculation properly accounted for
costs internal to the production process but purposefully excluded other external
costs. That is, the calculation did not account for costs that might be borne by

83.
See George Joseph Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action. An Appendix
to Theories of Economic Regulation, in THE ESSENCE OF STIGLER 67, 67-68 (Kurt R_ Leube
& Thomas Gale Moore eds., l986).
84.
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1403.
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society as a whole-that is, negative externalities-if the good were to be
provided.8
Modifying the above community center hypothetical, assume that the
center costs $100,000, but that the citizens who will use it will reap a greater
aggregate benefit from the center, quantified at $200,000. When one accounts for
the benefits created by the center and the direct cost of providing it (for example,
building costs), it seems desirable for the center to be constructed. However,
assume that the center, if built, will decrease the value of neighboring houses, a
negative externality. Most would agree that, at some point, the decline in property
value would be too great to justify the center's construction. How to determine
when that decline is, in fact, too great is debatable and depends on the model of
efficiency one chooses to employ. This will be explored in Part 11, which focuses
on the efficiency prong of the subsidy analysis.
11. DETERMINING THE OVERALL EFFICIENCY
OF CHARITABLE TRANSFERS
Subsidy theory posits that taxpayers should be entitled to a charitable
deduction only when a deductible transfer from the donor-taxpayer to the doneeorganization would be efficient from an overall societal perspective. There are,
however, different models for determining efficiency, and it is not immediately
clear which method is appropriate for determining whether a charitable deduction
is justified.
Section A explores the two methods commonly used to evaluate
efficiency: the Pareto method and the Kaldor-Hicks method.8 Although the Pareto
method seems to provide an ideal measure for evaluating whether a charitable
deduction is justified, it is of limited use in this context, as all deductible donations
will fail to be efficient under this model. In response, subsidy theorists use the
Kaldor-Hicks method to analyze the deduction.8

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
85.
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HAitv. L. REv. 713, 719-20 (1996) (referring to social
costs and externalities interchangeably).
See THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS,
86.
PROPERTY, LITIGATION

4 (1997) [hereinafter

MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW]

(stating that

the Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto concepts of efficiency are most commonly used in
economics); THOMAS J.MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH To LAW 4-6 (2004) [hereinafter
MICELI, ECONOMIC APPROACH]

(explaining that the basic definition of efficiency in

economics is Pareto efficiency and that economists solve problems with the Pareto method
by using the Kaldor-HiEcks method).
87.
This method does not provide results useful in evaluating whether a
charitable deduction is warranted in many cases where the transfer causes negative
externalities. See infra Part ll.B.
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A. The Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks Models of Efficiency
Economists have devised various models to determine whether an action
is efficient, with the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks models being most commonly
employed. 8
A transfer is "Pareto efficient" if the transfer would "make at least one

person better off and no one worse

off",8 9

To apply this model to a potentially

deductible donation, assume a taxpayer donates to Organization X, which would
use the funds to construct a community center that creates an aggregate benefit of
$200,000 for those who can use it. The center will cost $100,000 to build. The
donation will clearly make some "better off." Thus, a donation to Organization X
is Pareto, efficient so long as nobody is "worse off'-that is, harmed. 90 Assume
now that construction of the center will cause the value of Taxpayer B's home to
decline. Donations will be inefficient under the Pareto model because the donation
would be used in a way that harms B. Importantly, whether the transfer would
cause Taxpayer B's property to decline in value by $10 or by $1 million is
immaterial under the Pareto method. The existence of a harmed party, irrespective
of the magnitude of harm, causes a transfer to be inefficient under this method.9' If
this efficiency model were used, a deduction to Organization X would never be
warranted.
There is a strong argument that charitable deductions should be granted
only to transfers fulfilling this principle. That is, a taxpayer should only be able to
92
deduct amounts donated to organizations that do not cause any harm to others.
As discussed, allowing taxpayers to claim charitable deductions for amounts
donated to particular organizations is equivalent, in effect, to the government
providing a direct subsidy to those organizations. 9 3 There is nothing particularly
94
troubling with the government subsidizing organizations that do not cause injury.

88.

See generally MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, supra note 86 (providing a
MICELI, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra

comprehensive analysis of economics in the law);
note 86 (same).

89.
ATINSON & STIGLITZ, supra note 13, at 509; see also MICELI, ECONOMIC
APPROACH, supra note 86, at 4 (explaining that under the definition of Pareto efficiency,

"1reallocations are only allowed if neither party is made worse off'); Gergen, supra note 3, at
1401 (stating that there is a powerful argument for a deduction or credit because a deduction
means the policy makes "some people better off and no person worse off').
90.
See sources cited supra note 89.
91.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
92.
In fact, adherence to the Pareto principle is often viewed as a baseline
requirement for public policy actions. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare
and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1905, 1917
(1987) ("[Alcceptance of this principle is firequently considered a prerequisite of any

acceptable social decision-making rule." (citing

YEXV-KXVANG NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS:

INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC CONCEPTS 30-32 (1980))).
93.
See Surrey, supra note 7, at 726.
94.
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 85
(1992). Professor Lawson discusses why the Pareto model is a particularly "morally
attractive model. i a Pareto superior transaction, somebody gains and nobody loses. Who
could possibly object? The answer is that no one can object-by definition." Id, One mfight
go further and object to using public money to facilitate transfers that are Pareto efficient on
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The situation seems quite different, however, when government funds enrich some5
taxpayers while actually causing others harm by creating negative extemnalities.
Requiring transfers to be Pareto efficient ensures that this will not happen, making
the Pareto model seem ideal for evaluating whether a transfer should be
deductible.9
Realistically, however, every deductible donation will harm some group
of taxpayers in some manner.9 7 For instance, since the cost of the deduction is
spread among all taxpayers, those who do not benefit from the goods provided by
the donee-organization will suffer universal subsidization harm, illustrated fully
below.9 8

Further, it will almost always be the case that for any donation, some

taxpayer will believe it to be foolish and will feel negative emotions about the
government subsidizing the transfer and about the organization to which the
donation has been made. As these taxpayers will be worse off as a result of the
transfer, it is Pareto inefficient. In the context of the hypothetical above, even if
B's property value were not affected, a deductible donation to Organization X
would still be inefficient under the Pareto method because of these other harms.
The inevitable presence of this harmed group "ensures that a deduction never can
be justified as a Pareto improvement. "99 Thus, while it seems ideal for deductions
the ground that government fuinds should not enrich select taxpayers, while leaving others
unaffected. So-called "[e]ntitlement theories ... may not endorse a tax that increases the
welfare of an 'undeserving' individual even if that change does not reduce the welfare of
any other person." Bankman & Griffith, supra note 92, at 1917; see also Frank 1.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HA~.v. L. REv. 1165, 1176 (1967) (mentioning a possible objection
to the goal of efficiency and its ethical implications). But see id (citing JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FoUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUrIONAL DEMOCRACY 62 (1962)) ("Implicit in the notion of efficiency is an ethical
premise which few would care to dispute: that a change in the resource use which can
improve the situations of some people without damaging the situations of any is
desirable.").
"Enormous problems exist in justifying a deduction on the ground that,
95.
although it hurts some people, it helps others more." Gergen, supra note 3, at 1413; see also

Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100

YALE L.J.

1211, 1217 (1991) (describing cases in which someone loses regardless of how desirable
changes may appear to most individuals).
96.
See Lawson, supra note 94, at 85 ("If someone is disadvantaged by an
action, then by virtue of that fact the action is not Pareto superior."); see also supra note 89.
As Professor Gergen recognizes, there is a "darker aspect to this picture:
97.
Some people lose because of a deduction." Gergen, supra note 3, at 1412.
See infra text accompanying notes 114-21.
98.
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1412; see also Calabresi, supra note 95, at 1216
99.

(explaining that if the Pareto test had any force, "it would mean that, however bizarre or
nefarious the original starting points and tastes they defined, and however outrageous the
wealth and power distributions that our law created or took for granted, nevertheless
existing laws could be attacked if they were not Pareto optimal"). The fact that the Pareto
model will render almost all charitable contributions inefficient is not unique. "Almost
nothing, and perhaps even nothing, meets the strict criteria of Pareto superiority in the real
world if one is seeking to define 'efficiency' for an entire society." Lawson, supra note 94,
at 85. This is because most transfers will cause some individual or group of individuals
some sort of harm Calabresi, supra note 95, at 1216-17.
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to only be given with respect to Pareto-efficient transfers, an alternative model is
needed unless the charitable deduction is to be repealed in its entirety 0 0 (or if one
is willing to abandon the notion of overall efficiency altogether).
The Kaldor-Hicks model is used by subsidy theorists as the alternative
measure for analyzing the charitable deduction. Formally stated, under the KaldorHlicks model, "[o]ne state of affairs (E0) is Kaldor-Hicks efficient to another (E) if
and only if those whose welfare increases in the move from E to E' could fully
compensate those whose welfare diminishes with a net gain in welfare."' 0' Simply
put, one asks whether the total net benefits produced by the transfer (here the
potentially deductible donation) offset the total harms caused by the same.
Consider the above example, where Organization X can construct a community
center for $100,000, resulting in a $200,000 benefit to those who will use it and an
indeterminate decline in B's property value. A deductible donation to Organization
X would be deemed inefficient under the Kaldor-Hicks model if the decline in B's
property value plus the other harms produced by the donation (such as universal
subsidization harm) would exceed $100,000 (the benefit less the cost of the
center). Thus, if this efficiency model were used, deductions for amounts donated
to Organization X would not be warranted in these circumstances. Unlike the
Pareto model, however, the Kaldor-Hicks model would not render deductible
donations inefficient in all cases. If the decline in property value plus the other
harms produced by the donation would not exceed $100,000 (the benefit of the
center less its costs), then the donation would be efficient under the Kaldor-Hicks
model. Thus, if this model were used, deductible donations made to Organization
X would be warranted in cases where the decline in property value was sufficiently
small. By contrast, the same deduction is not justified under the Pareto model so
long as there is any harm caused, regardless of its magnitude.
The Kaldor-HI-cks model is a sensible measure for evaluating efficiency
in many contexts. The model, for example, allows economists to make efficiency
02
claims in situations where they are unable to quantify actual gains and losses.
Further, without the model, "economists would have no way to deem the gains to
the winners 'larger' than the losses to the losers"' 03 even where "the number of
100.

Judge Posner has stated:

Because the conditions for Pareto superiority are almost never satisfied
in the real world, yet economists talk quite a bit about efficiency, it is
pretty clear that the operating definition of efficiency in economics is not
Pareto superiority. When an economist says that free trade or
competition or the control of pollution or some other policy or state of
the world is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks
efficient.
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-10 (3d ed. 1986). See generally J. R.
Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECoN. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor,
Welfare Propositionsof Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 EcoN. J.
549 (1939).

101.
102.

See JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 98 (1988).
See MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, supra note 86, at 5-6 (discussing the

applicability of the Kaldor-Hicks model to solve the noncomparibility problem of the

Pareto model).
103.

Lawson, supra note 94, at 90.
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04
people who gain from an action is much larger than the number who lose.",
Thus, the Kaldor-Hicks model preserves economists' ability to say "usefuil
things," 105 deeming "certain actions . . . efficient when 6 they result[] in gains in
10
utility or welfare for some people but losses for others."

While it is clear, however, that the Pareto model cannot always be utilized
to evaluate when a charitable deduction should be granted, it is not clear that the
Kaldor-Hicks model always yields usefuil results in making this evaluation.
There are two identifiable groups whenever a taxpayer donates to a
charitable organization. The transfer benefits the first group, sometimes referred to
as a "high preference minority," 10 but does not benefit the second group. When
discussing the charitable deduction, subsidy theorists have focused on the instance
where the second group, while not benefitted, either does not suffer any harm from
the transfer or suffers minimal harm.' 0 8 Specifically, scholarship using subsidy
theory has tended to deal with the case where the harm of subsidizing a charity is
limited to the general economic harms from the revenue effect of the deduction
and relatively slight psychic harm suffered by individuals who must live in a world
where others can deduct amounts donated to organizations those individuals view
as foolish or strange. In economic terms, the harmed group is assumed to be
"relatively indifferent"10 9 and the organization in question does not create any
harms to society other than the small negative externalities assumed.
Part II.B begins with this "assumed case" (the case upon which subsidy
theorists have tended to focus) and applies the Kaldor-Hi-cks model to it. It shows
that when harm is limited in this assumed manner, it should generally be simple
for transfers to be deemed efficient under the Kaldor-Hicks model and, thus,
generally simple to justify deductions when the other prongs of the framework are
fulfilled. Because of this, subsidy theorists' assumption that the harmed group is
relatively indifferent is, in effect, equivalent to an assumption that transfers are
generally efficient. Perhaps for this reason, the efficiency prong of the theory has
not been explored in sufficient depth.
After discussing the assumed case of relative indifference, this Article
discusses the more difficult cases where harms are not so limited-where the
harmed group is not merely relatively indifferent, and the transfers create more
serious negative externalities than those assumed. These situations have not, to
date, been the subject of scholarly focus. As will be illustrated through detailed
examples, the Kaldor-Hficks model does not act as a sufficient tool in determining
whether a charitable deduction is warranted in these important cases. As such, the
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.

107.
See Gergen, supra note 3, at 1399 (discussing "high preference minority"
and "relatively indifferent majority"); Hochman & Rodgers, supranote 74, at 227-28.
108.
See Gergen, supra note 3, at 1399-1407 (summarizing the work of
economists Harold Hochman, James Rodgers. and Burton Weisbrod). The three economists'
works seem confined to the instance where a transfer does not benefit a group, but that
group is either not harmed or suffers negligible harm. Id.
109.
Id. at 1399.
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subsidy theory cannot act as the sole justification for charitable deductions when
negative externalities beyond those assumed are present.
B. The Assumed Case of Relative Indifference: Negative Externalities Limited
to Universal Subsidization Harm and Slight Psychic Harms
Scenario 1. Assume that Taxpayer C gives $100 to Organization
C, which provides vaccines for a particular disease. D does not
receive a vaccine and, in fact, lacks an opinion about the
vaccines, Organization C, or anything related. If asked, however,
D would find Taxpayer C's donation a somewhat foolish use of
$ 100.110
In applying the Kaldor-Hicks model, one must weigh benefits against
possible harms.' Let us first start with the harms side of the equation. There is
minimal harm caused by the transfer in Scenario 1, since the harmed group (here
D) is "relatively indifferent" (the case assumed by subsidy theorists).' 1 2 One might
say that D suffers psychic harm because he disapproves of how Taxpayer C spent
the $100. To the extent, however, that one wishes to account for this psychic harm,
it is slight.'
The transfer in Scenario 1 also causes a more subtle type of harn. D has
subsidized Taxpayer C's donation because he, along with all other taxpayers,
absorbed the cost of C's tax deduction. D's tax rate will be higher than it would
have been in the absence of a charitable deduction, as compensation for the
revenue lost by the deduction necessitates a higher rate." 4 Thus, money that D
would have used to further his own ends was used to fu~nd C's donation to a charity
to which he is indifferent. This universal subsidization harm occurs whenever one
makes a deductible contribution because taxpayers will inevitably donate to causes
to which others are indifferent." 5 The efficiency calculus must account for this

harm."

6

110.
Recall that we are assuming that the good is public enough to fulfill the
public good criterion. Vaccines do not meet the formal definition-that is, they are not nonrivalrous or non-exclusive. They do, however, create many positive externalities that seem
sufficient to grant a deduction if needed to prevent underfunding. See supra Part ll.A.
111.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
112.
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1399; see also id at 1400-07.
113.
Id. at 1412 ("No matter how worthy the cause, some will complain that they
do not want to help support a charity indirectly through a deduction. Some may dislike the
Salvation Army because they believe that the poor are lazy and deserve to suffer in poverty.
Some may oppose the Red Cross because they think it paternalistic.").
114.
See Surrey, supra note 7, at 726 (noting that both direct expenditures
(government assistance) and programs fuinded through deductions "keep our tax rates
high"); see also Buckles, supra note 46, at 951 ("[Ilf all else is held constant, the
availability of the charitable contributions deduction means that tax rates must be increased
to compensate for the diminished income tax base.").
115.
See Gergen, supra note 3, at 1412.
116.
The astute observer might wonder how, in a democratic society, the
deduction can be passed over C's objection. For a theory regarding this issue, see COLOMBO
&HALL, supra note 82, at 107-08.
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Before proceeding to this analysis, recall the example presented in Part
ILB to fully understand the concept of universal subsidization harm. In that
example, Taxpayer A was willing to pay $5 for Unit 1 of a public good. Taxpayer
B was not willing to pay anything even though he would benefit $2 from provision
of the good. This illustrated a collective action problem and resulted in the public
good being underfunded. The example demonstrated that this collective action
problem could be corrected, and the good optimally provided, if the government
granted Taxpayer A a deduction worth $2. Further, assuming a finite universe of
taxpayers consisting only of A and B, an optimal payment pattern was achieved, as
both A and B could be said to have paid an amount equal to their marginal benefit
from the provided unit." 17 As discussed, the deduction granted to Taxpayer A
seems unobjectionable, as nobody paid more than the benefit received from the
provision of the good." 8 Thus, no one suffered harm, and the transfer was even
efficient under the Pareto model." 9
Assume now, however, that Z is also a member of the universe of
taxpayers and that she is not affected by provision of the public good (that is, she
is indifferent). Under the same general facts of the example, Taxpayer A will pay
the producer of the public good $7 and claim a deduction worth $2, allowing the
organization to produce the good at the optimal level. Taxpayer A will have paid
$5 for the good and the cost of his $2 tax savings will be spread between B and Z.
Taxpayer B will pay less than his marginal benefit for the public good, which is
optimal. Thus, the benefit B enjoys from the good's provision will outweigh his
universal subsidization harm, so that he is better off. However, Taxpayer Z will
pay more than her marginal benefit, presumed to be zero. This "excess"~ payment is
120
Z's universal subsidization harm, as it is not outweighed by any related benefit.
Having illustrated the concept of universal subsidization harm, the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency calculus can now be applied to Scenario 1. D (the
relatively indifferent party) will suffer slight psychic harms and universal
subsidization harm, described fully above.
21
A simplified analysis can be conducted by defining several variables:'
allow b = total benefit created by the donation;
allow d = donation;
allow c = cost of creating the benefit;
117.
118.
119.
120.

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part H.A.
To clarify, all taxpayers will suffer universal subsidization harm in that they

will all share the cost of the deduction. However, the benefitted group will also enjoy a
benefit from the donation, which may or may not be outweighed by the slice of the
deduction he or she paid for in the form of a higher tax rate.
The equations presented are oversimplified and do not account for other
121.
variables. They, for instance, disregard the opportunity cost of the taxpayers suffering
universal subsidization harm. In Scenario 1, the equation does not account for the fact that
D not only paid for a part of C's donation, but that he might have invested that money,
generating fuiture income. Reaching this level of complexity is unnecessary here, as
Equation 1, simplified as it is, allows the desired point to be made.
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allow h =harm caused by the transfer;
allow u

universal subsidization harm;
allow t. = marginal tax bracket of taxpayer n
=

2

allow d,, donation made by taxpayer n;

thenu =t, d+t

2

d 2 + - .+ tndn

In Scenario 1, only one taxpayer (C) donates and, if one assumes his
marginal tax rate to equal t, then u = td. (Alternatively, one could assume all
taxpayers making relevant donations have the same tax rate.)
With this assumption, the transfer in Scenario I will be efficient when the
net benefits created by the donation exceed the harm caused. Thus, the transfer
will be efficient when:
b -c >h.
The harm to the donor (here C) is the after-tax cost of the donation, or
(1 - t)d. Ignoring the psychic harms suffered by D (the relatively indifferent party)
for simplicity and because it is so slight as to not have a meaningful impact on the
calculations, the only other harm suffered is D's universal subsidization harm.
Thus, the transfer will be efficient if:
b -c >u + (I-t)d.

(Eq.l1)

When harm is confined in this assumed manner, it would seem quite
simple for most donations to meet this equation and be deemed efficient under the
Kaldor-Hicks framework.
To see why, one needs to unpack the total benefit created by the donation
(variable b) into two components:
allow b, = benefit created by d (the donation) to members of society other
than the donor;
allow
donation (d);

bd =

benefit enjoyed exclusively by the donor because of his

then b =b, +bd.

(Eq-.2)

Variable b, represents the positive externalities, or benefits, shared by
members of society (other than the donor) as a result of the donation. In Scenario
1, the most obvious benefits are those resulting directly from the use of the
donated funds. One would first need to quantify the direct benefits by assigning
value to the improved health of those vaccinated. One could also imagine other
secondary benefits, perhaps looking to the benefits enjoyed by a society that now
has a lesser occurrence of a certain disease, such as improved work productivity

and lower health care

23

Costs.'1

122.
One's marginal tax bracket refers to the tax rate at which one's last dollar of
income would be taxed. It allows one to quantify the dollar effect of the deduction.
123.
In discussing the idea of secondary benefits, Professor Gergen provides the
following example: "The moral or intellectual education of parishioners and students
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The variable bd represents the benefit that the donor (here C) enjoys as a
result of his donation. Much has been written on the benefits donors may receive
when donating money or engaging in "other-regarding" transfers such as gifts.
First, the donor may, as a member of society, benefit from the organization's use
of the funds (C may, for instance, receive a vaccine from Organization C). Further,
the donor may enjoy a psychic benefit from making the donation-if he "feels
good" for having done so-often referred to as the "warm glow" effect.'214 Here
one can easily imagine C experiencing some sort of "warm glow"' 2 5 and pride
from giving to an organization with a purpose in which he believes. There is also
another less obvious effect-the donor may indirectly benefit ftrm the
beneficiary's increase in welfare.'126 Here, C may derive further utility from
knowing that his donation has prevented the illness of others (that is, his utility is
2
increased by the beneficiaries' increase in Utility).'1 1
Under fundamental economic assumptions, a donor will not make a
donation unless the various benefits he receives have an intrinsic worth to him that
is at least equal to the after-tax cost of the donation; otherwise the donor would be
acting in an economically irrational manner.128 Let us assume, then, that bd is equal
to the donor's after-tax cost of giving, or (1 - t)d.
Incorporating these concepts, the transfer is efficient ifb - c>u +(I -t)d;

(Eq. 1)

b + bd-c >u + (I-t)d;

(using Eq. 2)

b, + (1 - t)d -c >u + (1 - t)d;
b-c > u;
b,- c > td.

indirectly benefits everyone in the community, and the presence of churches, museums, and
schools makes a community a more stimulating and attractive place to live for everyone."
Gergen, supra note 3, at 1398. Certainly, there is ample room to debate what types of
benefits should be included in the Kaldor-Hicks calculus. For an interesting discussion of

psychic benefits, see id. at 1407-12. Resolving this debate, however, is not necessary here
because the purpose of the scenario is to illustrate concepts, not to perform actual
calculations. The scenario demonstrates what scholars mean when referring to the benefits
created by a charitable transfer, and thus exemplifies the sorts of items that appear on the
"benefits side" of the Kaldor-Hicks equation.
124.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 4, at 672 (describing "warm glow giving,"

wherein a donor is motivated by deriving personal pleasure from having been the instrument
by which another person's welfare has been increased). Columbo adds, "The 'warm glow'
may also be derived from the gratitude of the recipient to the donor." Id. at 672-73; see also
James Andreoni, Giving with Impure Altruism. Applications to Charity and Ricardian
Equivalence, 97 J. POL. EcoN. 1447, 1447-52 (1989) (finding that people receive a "warm
glow" from giving); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gits, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 469

(1995) ("Presumably, altruism is an important motivation for many gifts.").
125.
See sources cited supranote 124.
126.
See Kaplow, supra note 124, at 470 ("[T]he donor's utility.
on the donee's utility.").
127.
Id
128.
Id.

..

depends..
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In other words, so long as the net benefit of the donation to society
exceeds the product of the donated amount and the donor's tax rate (which is the
universal subsidization harm), the transfer will be deemed efficient. If, for
instance, a donor has a tax rate of 33%, the net societal benefits of the donation
need only be 33% of the donated amount for the transfer to be efficient and for a
129
deduction to be warranted under subsidy theory.
This shows that when harm is limited in such an assumed manner, it
should generally be simple for transfers meeting the other prongs of the subsidy
analysis to be deemed efficient under the Kaldor-HiFcks model and, thus, generally
simple to justify deductions. Most importantly, these transfers concern the
provision of goods, which meet the (quasi-) public good prong described above.
Considering the number of individuals likely to benefit from goods sufficiently
displaying the properties of non-excludablity and non-rivairousness, it would seem
rather simple for donations to organizations providing these goods to provide net
benefits exceeding the product of the original donation and the donor's tax rate,
thereby fulfilling the equation developed. In Scenario 1, for instance, one assumes
that the donation will help multiple individuals avoid illness as a result of
receiving vaccines. One would think this benefit would easily exceed the product
of the original donated amount and the donor's tax rate. In fact, to the extent this
does prove difficult, it seems that the good provided would be unlikely to be
"public enough" to pass the first prong of the subsidy theory framework, rendering
analysis of the third efficiency prong unnecessary. In light of this, subsidy
theorists' assumption that the harmed group is relatively indifferent seems closely
equivalent to an assumption that transfers meeting the other prongs of the subsidy
analysis will generally be efficient.
In this assumed case, taxpayers are not harmed by the organization to
which the transfer is made, and the psychic harms and universal subsidization
harm resulting from the tax deduction are not particularly severe. In other words,
the organization to which the donation is made does not create any negative
externalities. Realistically, however, the universe of harmed parties is not confined
in this assumed manner, 30 and the donee-organization may cause (possibly
serious) harm to some group of taxpayers. 1 3 1 Thus, there are many cases where one
has to account for additional items on the harms (right) side of the developed
equation, and it will not be so simple for the transfer to be deemed efficient.
129.
Put another way, if we assume c =d (because the cost of producing the
benefit is the donation) then the transfer will be efficient under the Kaldor-Hicks method,
and a deduction warranted, if the benefit to society exceeds the sum (td + d). Thus, the value
created beyond the donation need only be the product of the donor's tax rate and the
donation (in this example, 33% of the donation). Considering the nature of collective goods,
described above, this should not be difficult to achieve. Once again, the Author recognizes
that this equation is oversimplified but hopes that it demonstrates the basic point that an
application of the Kaldor-Hicks model to transfers that both fulfill the other subsidy theory
prongs and concern relatively indifferent harms will very often result in the donations being
deemed efficient and a deduction warranted.
130.
As Professor Gergen recognizes, there is a "darker aspect to this picture:
Some people lose because of a deduction." Gergen, supra note 3, at 1412.
Id.
131.
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Subsidy theorists, and scholars in general, have not considered how to analyze the
case for a charitable deduction when other negative externalities exist. The
remainder of this Part will discuss and analyze these previously unaddressed
scenarios.
C. Relaxing Subsidy
Externalities

Theory's

Assumptions

and

Considering

Negative

This Section will present various cases in which organizations cause
negative externalities beyond those assumed by subsidy theorists. Because other
theories that analyze the charitable deduction similarly fail to take into account
negative externalities caused by donee-organizations,' 3 2 this Article's discussion
regarding charities that cause harm is applicable to an analysis under these other
theories as well.
Before proceeding, it seems worthwhile to clarify that this Article will
concern itself with affirmative harms--harms in which the organization in
question actually worsens the position of certain individuals. It will not focus on
other less traditional harms, such as displacement harms and foregone benefits.
A brief explanation of these latter harms will suffice. Consider the
following:
Scenario 2: This year, Taxpayer C donated $100 to Organization
1, which provides vaccines for mumps. There exists another
organization, Organization 2, devoted to feeding the poor.
In assessing harms one might argue that the transfer caused harm to
Organization 2 because the one hundred dollars donated to Organization 1 might
have been donated to Organization 2, resulting in "displacement harm." Like
subsidization harm, displacement harm is universal. Indeed, a donation to one
charity might always be argued to take a donation away from another. Whenever
an individual contributes to a particular organization, all other organizations might
claim that they may have received the donation. Under the practical facts of
Scenario 2, however, displacement harm is extremely speculative because there is
no particular reason to think that C would have donated to Organization 2 had she
not donated to Organization 1. The goals of feeding the poor and providing

132.
For instance, Mark Hall and John Colombo present an intriguing theory
regarding the deduction and "why the majority of the electorate would go along with such a
subsidy" of public goods to which they attach little or no value. See COLOMBO & HALL,
supra note 82, at 107-08. They posit that donors are able to donate to certain organizations
because of a complex "back-scratching" scheme in which B agrees to allow A to deduct
contributions to A's favorite organization because A has a similar problem with B's favorite
organization. Id While this might justify why "opera lovers are willing to scratch the backs
of ruffled grouse lovers so long as the favor is returned," Fleischer, supra note 25, at 213
(citing COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 82, at 108), this theory, to the extent it should be used
to justify a deduction, cannot alone justify deductions for organizations causing large
negative externalities (nor does this Article suggest that either Hall or Colombo would
extend their theory this far). Like most theories, Hall and Colombo's theory does not
contend with these situations.
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vaccines, respectively, are quite unrelated to one another. 13 3 Thus, if one wanted to
account for displacement harm, it would have a negligible effect on the efficiency
calculus, since it would be discounted by an extremely low probability factor- 3 '
One could identify circumstances in which this harm is more likely to
occur. For instance, displacement harms will be more likely to occur when direct
competition exists among organizations. Discussing the circumstances in which
competition is most severe, economists explain that "[o]rganizations [sharing]
certain attributes (issues, markets, members, resources) tend to compete with one
another."' 3 5 The degree to which organizations compete depends on, among other
things, an organization's level of autonomy.' 3 6 Autonomy refers to "the extent to
which an organization possesses a distinctive area of competence, a clearly

133.
This assumes that individuals make donations based on causes that an
organization pursues. Being an extremely personal decision, it would be foolish to assume
all individuals donate in the same fashion. However, it seems extremely likely that a large
majority of taxpayers consider an organization's causes. Some websites purportedly
advising taxpayers on how to give wisely generally assume it to be so. See, e.g., Joellen

Perry, Directory of America's Charities, Step 2: Choose the Charity,

USNEws.COM,

http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/chafities/articleslstep2.htm, (last visited Oct. 1,
20 10) (suggesting that, when choosing a charity, one should first "select[] a cause and [find]
groups that appear to be working toward the same goal"); Shelley Elmblad, How to Choose
a Charity. Find a Non Profit for Charitable Donations, suITEl0I.Com (Mar. 21, 2007),
http://personalbudgeting.suitel0l.com/article.cfm/how -to -choose -a -charity ("To choose a
charity you need to decide what type of cause you want to contribute to, if the charity uses
financial resources responsibly and how you want to make donations."); Suzanne E.
Coffman, Tips for Choosing a Charity: A Donor's JO-Step Guide for Giving Wisely,
GUIDESTAR.COM

(Dec. 2005), http://www.guidestar.orglrxa/news/articles/2005/tips-for-

(advising
choosing-a-charity-a-donors-l 0-step-guide-to-giving-wisely. aspx?articleld=794
taxpayers to start their decision process by asking "What is important to me? The
environment? Education? Hunger? Animal welfare? Helping sick children?;" to "[flocus on
[the charity's] mission;" and to "[clompare apples to apples" by "compar[ing] charities that
do the same kind of work"). In addition, websites that evaluate charities to help donors
make more informed decisions generally group charities by "cause"~ or "mission." See, e.g.,
CHARITY

NAVIGATOR,

http://www.charitynavigator.org/

(last visited Oct. 1, 2010)

(explaining that the navigator "works to advance a more efficient and responsive

philanthropic marketplace by evaluating the financial health of over 5500 of America's
largest charities" and directing users to "browse by category," which includes the option of

nine general causes);

CHvARITY GUIDE,

http://www.charityguide.org/ (last visited Nov. 12,

2010) (providing evaluations of charities, which are sorted by category or mission); Top-

Rated Charities, Am~. INST. OF PHILANTHROPY, http://www.charitywatch.org/toprated.html
(last updated Sept. 17, 20 10) [hereinafter CHARITY WATCH] (same).
134.
In calculating the expected harm, the dollar value of the harm would be
multiplied by the probability of that harm occurring. Considering the speculative nature of
the harm, an extremely low probability factor would discount the dollar value so that the
final figure would be marginal.
135.
Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of
Organizations,6 ADMtN. Sci. Q. 129, 156 (1961). See generally Marco A. Castaneda et al.,
Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits, 24 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 215 (2008) (discussing the theoretical and empirical etfects of competition on
nonprofits).
See Clark & Wilson, supra note 135, at 156.
136.
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demarcated clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a function,
service, goal, issue, or cause."' 3 7 Thus, an organization that is capable of providing
a unique public good for which there is no suitable substitute will have little
competition. On the other hand, if organizations serve similar purposes, they will
compete and the probability of displacement harm occurring will increase.
Suppose, for instance, that in Scenario 2, C was deciding whether to
donate to an organization that provided vaccines for mumps (Organization 1) or to
an organization that provided vaccines for measles (Organization 3). Suppose that
C decided to donate to Organization 1. There is a stronger argument that C might
have donated to Organization 3 (vaccinating for measles) had she not donated to

Organization 1 (vaccinating for

mumps).

38

The possible displacement harm

suffered by Organization 3 in this scenario is more probable than that occurring in
Scenario 2 because the organizations have similar purposes and so may compete
for donations.
With displacement harms more probable,13 9 related harms will also be more
likely to result. Specifically, by not receiving the donation, Organization 3 cannot
help those it might have helped with the displaced funds, arguably resulting in
40
harm akin to foregone benefits.'1
While the question of whether and how to account for such harms would be an
interesting topic for further discussion, this is not the type of negative externality
with which this Article is concerned. In Scenario 2 and the modified example, the
transfer did not affirmatively worsen the positions of the harmed group. instead,
137.

Id. at 158.

Websites evaluating charities usually sort by these general categories. See,
e.g., CHI-RTY GUIDE, supra note 133 (separating charities by the following six categories:
animal welfare; children's issues; community development; environmental protection;
health and safety; and poverty); CHARITY NAVIGATOR, supra note 133 (sorting charities by
following nine categories: Animals; Environment; International; Arts, Culture, Humanities;
Health; Public Benefit; Education; Human Services; and Religion); CHARITY WATCH, supra
note 133 (separating charities among more specific categories including: abortion and
family planning; AIDS; cancer; and terminally or chronically ill).
139.
Even if unreduced by a probability factor, the benefit enjoyed by the
organization receiving the donation will counteract the displacement harms of non-recipient
organizations in the Kaldor-Hicks calculus. In this scenario, for example, if Organization D
suffered a certain displacement harm of $100, there would be a counteracting $100 gain to
Organization C, which received the donated amount. Discussing displacement harms
remains important, however, because determining the circumstances in which they are
likely to occur allows one to determine the circumstances in which other harms that flow
from them, such as foregone benefits, occur.
140.
In traditional cost-benefit analysis, "forgone benefits are but one type of cost,
and forgone costs are simply benefits." Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and
138.

Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis of Law, 96

CALIF.

L.

REv. 323, 333 (2008). This harm is often discussed in the business context, where foregone
benefits take the form of lost profits. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (holding that the plaintiff, a data processing company, had
alleged injuries sufficient to confer standing when it alleged "that competition by national
banks in the business of providing data processing services might entail some future loss of
profits").
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the potential beneficiary group of a particular organization might have received
help were it not for a donation to another organization.'"4
The remainder of this Article is concerned with affirmative negative
externalities-that is, situations in which the organizations in question create
affirmative harm. Two affirmative negative externalities will be discussed. First,
this Article will discuss cases where charitable organizations cause negative
externalities through exclusion policies. It will then discuss cases where harms are
caused by the efforts of organizations to promote competing viewpoints on societal
issues. This part will analyze these transfers under the Kaldor-Hicks model offered
by subsidy theorists and show that this model cannot act as a sufficient tool for
determining whether a charitable deduction is justified when the charities in
question cause these negative externalities. As such, one must reach beyond the
economic models to analyze this problem.
In discussing these two cases, this Article will formulate two principles
that might be used to fill the gap and contend with situations where charities cause
harm. This is meant merely to be a starting point for discussion of this important
issue and is by no means pretending to offer a complete solution to the problem.
To reinforce this point, this Article will refer to the suggested gap-filling principles
as "preliminary principles." Finally, this Article will not discuss constitutional
issues that might emerge, reserving this for those with expertise in the area.
1. Negative Externalities Caused by Exclusion Policies
Scenario 3: Assume that there are two groups: Race A and Race
B. Assume Race A, whose members drastically outnumber the
members of Race B3, would prefer not to associate with members
of Race B. Race A establishes a religious organization. The
organization enforces a policy, which excludes members of Race
B. Taxpayers donate to the organization.
There is nothing in section 170(c) that would directly prevent taxpayers
from claiming deductions for the amounts donated to this organization.142 in
general, the primary requirement for claiming a charitable deduction is that the
taxpayer's donation is contributed to an organization with one of the purposes set
forth in that section (which includes organizations organized and operated for
religious purposes). 1 4 3 Nothing on the face of the tax code explicitly takes into
44
account the negative externalities caused by the exclusion policy described .,

141.
There seems to be a "substantial moral difference between actively harning
a person and not aiding her (often labeled the doing/allowing distinction)." Zamir &
Medina, supra note 140, at 332. Some economic theories make this distinction, while others
do not. Although deontologism recognizes the difference, "consequentialism seems to
disregard the intuitive distinction between harming a person to prevent comparable harms

befalling other people, and harming a person to further improve other people's well-being."
Id.
142.
See I.R.C. § 170(c) (West 2010).
Id There are other requirements that are not immediately implicated in this
143.
scenario.

144.

There are some narrow limitations on the ability of schools to engage in
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The Kaldor-Hicks model also seems to act as an insufficient tool to
determine whether taxpayers should be able to deduct amounts donated to this
hypothetical organization. Clearly, the negative externalities in this example
extend far beyond what is assumed by subsidy theorists in the case of relative
indifference. The Kaldor-Hicks model, while taking into account negative
externalities to some extent, seems to do so inadequately in this situation. In order
to conduct the analysis, one would have to first look at the benefits of the
donations (that is, the positive externalities created by the organization's use of the
donated funds). This would require one to account for the benefits created by the
church as well as the benefits Race A members "enjoy" by not having to associate
with members of Race B. One would then have to account for the negative
externalities caused by the exclusion policy. Some may immediately suggest that
such items are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. While a valid
point, it is not the most important one. Even if it were possible to quantify these
harms and benefits, the model does not ask the right questions for determining
whether a deduction is warranted.
When the Kaldor-Hicks model is applied, it is possible that the benefits
enjoyed by Race A members might outweigh the harms suffered by the Race B
members for the sole reason that members of Race A so greatly outnumber Race
B. This would, under the model, imply that donations to Race A's religious
organization should be deductible. This illustrates a general problem with using the
model to analyze the charitable deduction: so long as the benefitted group is
sufficiently larger than the harmed group, a deduction (that is, a subsidy) might be
justified no matter how egregious or profound the harm caused may be.
Furthermore, the Kaldor-Hicks model cannot account for the "thickness"
or "thinness" of the preferences involved. Most simply, suppose that members of
Race A do not have a particularly strong opinion about whether or not they
associate with members of Race B, but have a mild preference to avoid such
associations. Suppose, however, that members of Race B have an extremely strong
preference to not be excluded from places based on the color of their skin. If
members of Race A sufficiently outnumber members of Race B, their many "thin"
preferences might outweigh the small number of "thick" preferences of Race B,
simply because of the relative sizes of the two groups.
More thorny issues emerge if one looks at the nature of the preferences
involved. There seems to be, for instance, a qualitative difference between the
harm (no matter how strongly felt) one might experience by having to live in a
world where one must associate with individuals with whom one would rather not
associate and the harn one might experience by being excluded from participating
in an organization because of the color of one's skin. Conversely, there seems a
qualitative difference between the benefit experienced by not having to associate
with someone with whom one does not wish to associate and the benefit
experienced by being able to participate in society as one pleases. The KaldorHicks model cannot account for these differences, and the many "thin" benefits
experienced by the larger group may outweigh the several thick harms suffered by
racial discrimination while retaining their tax subsidies. See infra notes 147-155 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Bob Jones.
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the excluded group. This latter point-which makes qualitative differentiations
among preferences-is thorny to say the least, and this Article in no way seeks to
do more than identify' the issue and show that the Kaldor-Hicks model cannot
account for these differences.
Without having to further expound on this, one sees that the KaldorHicks model cannot sufficiently analyze situations in which negative externalities
are of this nature, rather than of the mild nature assumed in the case of relative
indifference. It seems, even from a common sense perspective, that there should be
some limit to the types of harm that the government subsidizes. The Kaldor-Hicks
model does not provide adequate limits. One possible limiting principle would
require that the government not subsidize organizations that impinge on an
individual's ability to live a full and meaningful life'4M as a fair and equal member
of society.'14 6 If this (or some version of this) first preliminary principle is accepted,
taxpayers should not receive deductions for amounts donated to organizations that
curtail anyone's ability to live in the prescribed manner. This would not require
one to get into the thomny morass of valuing preferences but would serve as a limit
to the types of harms that could be subsidized with public funds.
Applying this suggested principle to the example above, the deduction
would most certainly be deemed inappropriate. Hindering one's ability to
matriculate at a university based on skin color seems to impinge on one's ability to
live a full and meaningful life as a fair and equal citizen. Current law accords with
the suggested principle only to a limited extent.
In the now famous case of Bob Jones University v. United States, 47 the
university had an official policy of permitting unmarried African -Americans to
enroll as students but denying "admission to applicants engafed in an interracial
48
marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating."'
The Supreme Court removed the university's tax-exempt status 49 so that
individuals could not deduct amounts contributed to the university until the policy
was changed. The IRS had previously enacted a revenue ruling dealing with the
145.
This (and the second preliminary principle described below) is derived from
John Rawls's notions of a well-ordered democratic society. See RAwLs, supra note 16, at
18. This Article's usage of these principles is by no means intended to make a philosophical
judgment as to whether these notions are appropriate as overall societal goals. The
principles seem to provide a sensible "floor" for limiting the harms that the government
might subsidize and are used for that narrow purpose only.
146.
Id. at 19. In John Rawls's words, a person should be able to "take part in,
or . .. play a role in, social life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights and duties.
Thus, we say that a person is someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully
cooperating member of society over a complete life." Id. at 18. For an interesting article that
draws on Rawls's distinction between "right", and "good" in discussing the challenge of
defining a substantive standard that accounts for changes in social efficacy, see generally
Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do for You: Robertson v. Princeton
Liberal-Democratic Insights into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 Aiz. L. REv. 75
(2009).
147.
461 U.S. 574 (1983).
148.
Idat 581.
Id
149.
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same general facts, which provided in relevant part that "a school not having a
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' within the
common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code . .. and
accordingly does not qualify as an organization exempt from federal income
tax." 50 The Supreme Court's holding and the IRS ruling both accord with the
suggested preliminary principle. Not allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts
donated to Bob Jones University and organizations with similar policies would
ensure that the government does not subsidize organizations that impinge on the
ability of individuals to live as free and equal members of society.
To reach that result, however, the Supreme Court grafted an extremely
narrow public policy exception.15 '1The Court seemed to take pains to express the
narrowness of its decision. Rather than merely holding that racial discrimination
clearly violates public policy, it based its decision on a meticulous reliance on
Supreme Court precedent, outlining the history of its decisions regarding similar
issues. It stated:
Prior to 1954, public education in many places still was conducted
under the pall of Plessy v. Ferguson; racial segregation in primary
and secondary education prevailed in many parts of the countr....
Over the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this
Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a
firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination
in public education.
An unbroken line of cases following Brown v. Board of Education
establishes beyond doubt this Court's view that racial discrimination
in education violates a most 52fundamental national public policy, as
well as rights of individuals.
Thus, the Bob Jones Court makes clear that its finding is based on
previous case precedent, which would essentially prohibit a contrary finding. The
Supreme Court's holding seems purposefully narrow. In fact, it is not even clear
from Bob Jones that the Court would find that race-based exclusion policies would
"contravene[] public policy" in all circumstances.' 5 3 In a footnote, the Supreme
Court makes this very suggestion, writing:
We deal here only with religious schools-not with churches or
other purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest is
in denying public support to racial discrimination in education. As
noted earlier, racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive

150.
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
151.
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574.
152.
Id at 592-93 (citations omitted). For a more thorough discussion of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Bob Jones, see Johnny Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public
Policy Doctrine, 53 U.KAN. L. Rnv. 397, 400-03 (2005).
153.
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 585. Importantly. the IRS has used the public policy
exception to deny tax-exempt status to other organizations engaged in race-based
discrimination and in certain other limited contexts. For a summary of the IRS's relevant
rulings, see Buckles, supra note 152, at 404-07.
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influence on the entire educational process," outweighing any public
benefit that they might otherwise provide. 154
Thus, the Supreme Court expressly and deliberately leaves open the
possibility that even race-based exclusion policies might not be deemed to
contravene public policy if practiced by an organization other than an educational
one.155 While the IRS has ruled that certain non-educational organizations that
engage in race-based discrimination may not retain tax-exempt status (and,
therefore, may not maintain their ability to receive deductible contributions2', it has
not generally dealt with exclusion policies other than those based on race.' Since
it seems one cannot rely on Bob Jones or current IRS rulings to disallow
deductions in cases where negative externalities are created by non-race based
exclusion policies, additional principles are needed to analyze these situations.
For instance, the Boy Scouts of America "provides a program for young
people that builds character, trains them in the responsibilities of participating
citizenship, and develops personal fitness."' 5 7 The Boy Scouts of America
"specifically forbid membership to homosexuals," 158 finding that "homosexual
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill."159
Taxpayers may deduct amounts contributed to support the Boy Scouts.'6
Unlike the case of racial discrimination in schools, the Supreme Court and IRS
have not intervened to prevent this result. For the same reasons it was not
sufficient to analyze Scenario 3, the Kaldor-Hicks model is not sufficient for
analyzing whether this is appropriate. However, if one accepts the principle that
the government should not subsidize organizations that impinge on one's ability to
live a full and meaningful life as a fair and equal citizen, allowing taxpayers to
154.
155.

Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 604 n.29 (citations omitted).
Professor Buckles notes that "Uludicial decisions following Bob Jones add

little to the doctrine espoused by the Supreme Court." Buckles, supra note 152, at 403. For
more on the issue of how the court might rule in cases of racial discrimination in religious
organizations, see Martha Minnow, Should Religious Groups be Exempt from Civil Rights
Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REv. 781, 783 92 (2007), which discusses whether a religious
organization should lose its tax-exempt status for discriminatory treatment and focuses on
the conflict that may arise between religion and equality.
156.
See, e.g., Buckles, supra note 152, at 405-06 (describing several memoranda
and rulings in which the IRS addressed the public policy limitation on tax exemption for
entities-both educational and otherwise-with race-based classifications).

157.

Boy

SCOUrS OF AMERICA,

http://www.scouting.org (last visited Aug. 31,

2010).

158.
159.
160.

Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645, 665 (2000).

Idat644,654.
Donor Opportunities,

Boy

SCOUTS

OF

Am.

NAT'L

FOUND.,

http ://www. scouting. org/sitecore/content/BSAFoundation/DonorOpportunities.aspx
(last
visited Oct. 4, 2010). The Boy Scouts of America National Foundation is a sister
organization that "financially support[s] the mission, values, and programs of local councils
of the Boy Scouts of America and Scouting organizations throughout the world by
promoting and soliciting gifts, grants, and matching funds from individuals, corporations,
and foundations interested in supporting Scouting both nationally and internationally." BSA

National Foundation, Boy SCOUTS OF Am., http://www.scouting.org/scoutsource/
bsafouadation.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 20 10).
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deduct amounts donated to the Boy Scouts, which excludes homosexuals, seems
just as inappropriate as allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts donated to
universities that exclude individuals due to race-based criteria.
2. Negative Externalities Caused by Competing Versions of "The Good"
Scenario 4: Assume that Organization G seeks to pass legislation
that would make it illegal to hunt on grounds on which it is
currently permitted. Assume Organization H would seek to
oppose that legislation in order to preserve hunting on the
grounds in question. Assume that donations are used by each of
the groups to pursue their legislative aims. Finally, assume
Group G supports the goals of Organization G, believing that
hunting should be prohibited in the areas in question. Group H
supports the goals of Organization H. G, a member of Group G,
donates to Organization G.
Like Scenario 3, this scenario involves negative externalities that extend
beyond those assumed in the case Of relative indifference. Both Organizations G
and H seek to promote their contradicting versions of what is desirable in society
through legislation. Thus, the fuartherance of Organization G's purpose causes
results that contradict the purpose of Organization H (and vice versa). As a result,
when a donation is made to Organization G (as in this scenario) and used to further
its purpose, its supporters will benefit but Organization H's supporters, Group H,
will be harmed.
The Kaldor-Hicks analysis seems insufficient to determine whether G
should be able to deduct amounts donated to Group G, or more generally, whether
donors should be able to deduct amounts donated to organizations that seek to
change legislation to promote their particular view of what is desirable. Without
the need for direct quantification, should Group G's purpose be furthered, Group G
will enjoy benefits from living in a world where an activity it opposes is
prohibited. However, Group H will be harmed, since it will now be costlier for
Group H to pursue hunting activities. (The reverse would be true for donations to
Organization H used to advance its purpose. In that case, Group G would suffer
harm from living in a world where hunting is allowed in areas where it believes it
should not be, and Group H would enjoy its hunting activities.)
Assume now that Group G is much larger than Group H. The donation to
Organization G may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient under these assumptions simply
because the members of the benefitted group greatly outnumber the members of
the harmed group. If deductions were justified whenever transfers were KaldorHicks efficient, a deduction for amounts donated to Organization G might be
deemed proper and a deduction for amounts donated to Organization H deemed
improper, solely because of the relative size of the competing groups.
To generalize, if one organization has a support base sufficiently larger
than that of an organization pursuing opposing aims, a transfer to the latter
organization might be deemed inefficient simply because the large number of
harms might outweigh the small number of benefits. Conversely, a donation to the
former organization could often be deemed efficient because the large number of
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benefits could often outweigh the small number of harms. The Kaldor-Hicks
model would, therefore, have a tendency to grant deductions for donations made to
groups with the largest support bases and deny deductions for donations made to
groups with less support. This would undermine the goals of the charitable
deduction-the same goals promoted by subsidy theory-discussed in Part 1. The
Kaldor-Hicks method would perpetuate the tyranny of the majority that the
deduction is supposed to prevent.' 61 Rather than promoting pluralism, 162 reliance
on the Kaldor-Hicks method would undermine the ability of organizations with
small support bases to receive aid.'163 istead, only the most powerful organizations
would be able to receive deductible contributions, a result which runs counter to
64
the goals of the charitable deduction (and intuitively seems inappropriate).1
Furthermore, as discussed above, the Kaldor-Hicks model cannot account
for thick and thin preferences. In this hypothetical, for instance, it is possible that
members of Group G have only a mild preference that hunting be prohibited,
whereas members of Group H may feel hunting to be an essential part of their
lives, such that the prohibition of hunting would cause them great harm. The
Kaldor-Hicks model cannot account for this, and if Group G is sufficiently large,
the many thin preferences of Group G members might outweigh the much smaller
number of thick preferences of Group H members. This problem could arise to a
much greater extent in other contexts. For instance, consider the following:
Scenario 5: Organization F is "a broad-based coalition of
California families, community leaders, religious leaders, profamily organizations and individuals . . . who have joined
together to support" 165 a proposition which would add the
following language to the California Constitution: "only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California."' 66 Group E engages in similar efforts to oppose the
proposition. Groups F and E support Organizations F and E,
respectively. F, a member of Group F, donates to Organization
F. 167
Like the hunting scenario, there are two organizations whose legislative
aims oppose one another. Thus, the furtherance of Organization F's purpose causes
results contrary to that of Organization E (and vice versa). It is possible that
161.

See Wiedenbeck, supra note 28, at 96-99.

162.
163.

Id.
See id

164.

See Bittker, supra note 25, at 46.

165.

About

ProtectMarriage.com,

PROTECTMARRIAGE.COM,

http://protectmarniage.comlaboutlorganization (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
166.
About Prop. 8, PROTECTMARRIAGE.com, http://protectmarriage.com/prop8
(last visited Sept. 16, 20 10).
167.
This scenario is patterned after the Proposition 8 controversy in California.
See Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage,N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at Al. For an excellent discussion of the involvement of the Mormon
Church in the passage of Proposition 8, see generally Brian Galle, The LDS Church,
Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 370
(2009).
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members of Group F (who support the passage of the proposition) have only a
mild preference that they live in a world in which members of the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community cannot marry,16 8 whereas members
of the LGBT community might have a very strong preference that they be able to
marry the partner of their choosing. 169 Further, even if this is not so, there may be a
qualitative difference between the possible harms members of Groups F and E
would suffer if contrary aims were advanced. One could argue that there is a
qualitative difference between members of Group F having to live in a world in
which LGBT couples can marry (the harm caused if Group E's agenda is
advanced) and members of the LGBT community being prevented from marrying
their partners (the harm caused if Group F's agenda is advanced). The KaldorHicks model cannot account for qualitative differences in these preferences. If
Group F is sufficiently larger than Group E, many thin preferences could outweigh
the smaller number of thick preferences, implying that taxpayers should be able to
17 0
deduct amounts donated to Group F but not Group E.
For the reasons discussed above, the Kaldor-Hicks model does not serve
as a complete method for determining whether a deduction is warranted in cases
where advancement of one organization's purpose always causes negative
extemnalities to opposing groups. Therefore, other principles must be used to
analyze the question.
The first preliminary principle-that the government should not subsidize
organizations that impinge on individuals' abilities to live as free and equal
citizens--does not seem sufficient. In the hunting example presented in Scenario
4, it is unlikely that any of the harms caused would rise to this level. However,
allowing groups to deduct amounts to such organizations seems problematic, as it
would cause the government to subsidize competing efforts to change society in
accord with the viewpoints of particular segments of the population. Importantly,
because each organization would receive a subsidy proportionate to the donations
it received, the subsidy would always be disparately allocated, even if both "sides"
could deduct amounts donated to their corresponding organizations-often
allowing those organizations with the largest donor bases to glean larger subsidies
168.

There is certainly a segment of the population which has more than a mild

preference. One organization stated that it believes failure to pass the proposition would
"undermine[] the value of marriage ...
at a time when [society] should be restoring
marriage, not undermining it." Why Proposition 8, PROTECT MARRIAGE.COM,
http://protectmarriage.comlaboutlwhy (last visited Sept. 16, 20 10).
This is certainly true. One organization whose mission is to "work to achieve
169.
equality and secure legal protections" for members of the LGBT community, About EQCA,
EQUALITY

CALIFORNIA,

http://www.eqca.org/site/pp.asp?c-kuLRJ9MRKrH&b=4025493

(last visited Sept. 26, 2010), stated that passage of the proposition would "[take] away the
fundamental freedom to marry [from LGBT couples] ... [and] alter the very intent of the

[California] Constitution, which is to treat all people equally under the law, Marriage,
EQUALITY CALIFORNIA, http://www.eqca. org/site/pp.asp?c-kuLRJ9MR~rH&b=402641 3
(last visited Sept. 26, 20 10).
These are dangerous waters into which this Article need not wade. This
170.
Article's discussion of preferences as thick and thin is merely to illustrate what cannot even
be considered in the Kaldor-Hicks model; it is not meant to definitively characterize
preferences.
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than those with smaller donor bases (because the more that is donated and
deducted, the greater the subsidy).
In light of this, in cases where there is a "plurality of reasonable
doctrines"17 '-that is, when there are various non-reconcilable conceptions of "the
good," all of which could be believed by reasonable people-it seems important
that taxpayers not be able to deduct amounts donated to organizations engaging in
efforts to promote any such conceptions.' 7 2 Adherence to this principle would
ensure that public funds not be used to disparately promote one viewpoint that, if
advanced, would automatically harm those with opposing viewpoints. If this
second preliminary principle is used, deductions would not be allowed in either
Scenarios 4 or 5. The law accords with this principle to some extent, but does not
reach far enough.
Currently, organizations may not receive deductible contributions if they
"participate in, or intervene in . .. any political campaign on behalf of. ...any
candidate for public office."17 3 Furthermore, an organization will not qualify as a
tax-exempt organization able to receive deductible contributions if "a substantial
part of its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or
otherwise. 174 Thus, under current law, donors could not deduct contributions to
any of the organizations in Scenarios 4 and 5. This is in accord with the second
preliminary principle and prevents the government from disparately subsidizing
one viewpoint over another.
However, further consideration of the two preliminary principles suggests
that the law does not go far enough in preventing donors from deducting amounts
given to organizations that promote viewpoints on societal issues over which there
is reasonable disagreement. Suppose that the facts are the same as Scenario 5, but
now Organization F, which supports the proposition that would ban LGBT
marriage, is a church.175 Under current law, donors may deduct amounts
171.

RAwts, supra note 16, at 138. Once again, Rawls's principle is selected

because of its appropriateness for analyzing the specific situation at hand and not to suggest
that it is an appropriate concept for evaluating society as a whole, or that other versions of
the concept he articulates would not be equally appropriate.
it
Rawls believes that when there is this "plurality of reasonable doctrines. ...
172.
is unreasonable or worse to want to use the sanctions of state power to correct, or to punish,
those who disagree with us." 1d
173.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010); see also id § 170(c)(2)(D).
174.
Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
175.
This is also patterned after the Proposition 8 controversy, where religious
organizations, particularly The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, also known as
the Mormon Church, were reported to play a large role in passing the Proposition.
McKinley & Johnson, supra note 167. For an excellent discussion of the involvement of the
Mormon Church in the passage of Proposition 8, see generally Galle, supra note 167.
Mormons donated, helped raise money, and provided "institutional support and dedicated
volunteers," to ensure that Proposition 8 would be passed. McKinley & Johnson, supra note
167. This discussion does not imply that the church did or did not violate these laws but is
simply meant to indicate the extensive role religious organizations play in political issues.
Mormon "[leaders were .. , acutely conscious of not crossing the line from being a churchbased volunteer effort to an actual political organization," in order to avoid running afoul of
the tax laws. 1d For further analysis on treading the line between acceptable and
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contributed to religious organizations (and certain other tax-exempt organizations)
that engage in lobbying efforts so long as certain criteria are fuilfilled. For instance,
the organization's "propaganda" efforts and efforts "to influence legislation"
cannot constitute a "substantial part of [its] activities."17 6 Further, the
organization's "primary objective" may not be one that "may be attained only by
legislation or a defeat of proposed legislation."'"7
In this modified example, the church can easily fuilfill the second
criterion, as a church's primary objective is the promotion of religion (not one
which can be attained only through legislative efforts). The church will also fulfill
the first criterion so long as lobbying efforts do not become substantial,17 8 allowing
donors to deduct amounts donated to the church even while the activities regarding
the proposition occur. By contrast, under current law, donors will not be able to
deduct amounts contributed to Organization E because "a substantial part of its
7
activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise."1 1
Should donors be able to deduct amounts made to churches that behave in
this manner, as they are able to under current law? Under the Kaldor-Hicks model,
one would have to weigh the benefits created by the church's activities. First, one
would have to account for the benefits created by the church's promotion of
religion. Next, one would have to account for the benefits to Group F, if the
church's efforts with respect to the proposition were successful. Group F would
enjoy a world where members of the LGBT community could not marry, in
accordance with their beliefs. On the other side of the equation, one would have to
consider the harms caused by the donation being used to advance the support of
the proposition. If successful, members of the LGBT community would not be able
to marry their partners.
Again, the important point is not that these harms and benefits are
difficult to quantify. What is important is that, even if one could quantify and
unacceptable tax-exempt charity lobbying activities, see Galle, supra note 167, at 371 75.
Importantly, however, the Mormon Church does not deny their extensive involvement.
Michael R. Otterson, the managing director of public affairs for the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints, reportedly stated: "We've spoken out on other issues, we've spoken
out on abortion, we've spoken out on those other kinds of things. . ...But we don't get
involved to the degree we did on this." McKinley & Johnson, supra note 167.
176.
I.R.C. § 501 (h); see also id § 170(c)(2)(D).
177.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv).
178.
Section 501(h) provides an "expenditure test" that charitable organizations,
other than churches, may elect to use in order to determine if activities are substantial.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii). Under this test, an organization may attempt to
influence legislation so long as associated expenditures do not exceed a specified ceiling
amount. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (h)(2)(B). The ceiling amount depends on the organization's
otherwise exempt income (that is, income used to further the purposes set forth in section
501(c)(3), such as advancing religion, discussed below), and may not exceed $1 million. Id
§ 4911. Thus, the larger the organization, the more that organization may spend to cause
antithetical harms. If an organization does not, or in the case of a church cannot, elect to use
the expenditure test provided in section 501(h), the situation becomes uncertain because it is
not clear what level of activity will qualify as substantial. See Galle, supra note 167, at 372
("There is no clear law on what comprises a 'substantial' amount of lobbying.").
179.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii).
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balance the benefits and harms, that balance would not be helpful to determine
whether donors should be allowed to deduct amounts donated to the church in
question; as shown in Scenarios 4 and 5, if the benefitted group is large enough,
any harm might be justified.
If, however, one also considered the two suggested preliminary
principles, allowing donors to deduct amounts to organizations that engage in
lobbying would seem inappropriate regardless of the organization's other
purposes. Looking at the first principle and applying it to the modified example,
one could argue that preventing an individual from marrying the partner of his or
her choosing impinges upon that individual's ability to live a full and meaningful
life as a fair and equal member of society. Thus, if one were to agree that the
government should not subsidize organizations that impinge on these abilities, then
donors should not be able to deduct amounts donated to the church described
above. However, one could avoid this somewhat messy inquiry by invoking the
second principle, which would alone lead to the conclusion that the deduction is
inappropriate as it would result in the government subsidizing the church's view of
"the good" (that LGBT couples should not have the right to marry) over other
reasonable conceptions of "the good" (that each individual has the right to marry
the person of his or her choosing).
Acceptance of this second preliminary principle would, therefore,
disallow deductions for organizations whose main purposes generally allow them
to receive deductible contributions, such as the church in this modified example,
when these organizations also use donations to promote their version of "the
good." This seems especially appropriate in this modified example since the
competing group (Group E) cannot receive tax-deductible contributions, meaning
that the subsidy would be extremely disparate.
This would by no means imply that organizations such as the church
described would be flatly prohibited from receiving tax-deductible contributions.
Such organizations would, instead, be required to segregate funds used to promote
their charitable aims and funds used for lobbying and campaigning. Only funds
used for the former aims would be deductible. Donors could specify for which
purposes they wished their contributions to be used, thereby allowing donors to
80
choose to what extent their donations would be deductible.'

180.
There will be vehement objections to this proposal as religious organizations
consistently argue that lobbying activities are inextricably intertwined with the promotion of
religion. Churches claim, for instance, to have "a religious duty to intervene in political
campaigns and that their religious mission compels them to speak out on behalf of
candidates who support the institution's religious mission or to speak against those who take
stands inconsistent with those beliefs." Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by
Churches and Charities,Hazardous/or501 (c)(3)s, Dangerous/forDemocracy, 95 GEO. L.J.
1313, 1316 (2007) (citing Policy Statement, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), God Alone is
Lord of the Conscience: Policy Statement and Recommendations Regarding Religious
Liberty, reprintedin 8 J.L. & RELIGION 331, 378 (1990)). One will need to decide whether
this argument is sufficient to allow the government to subsidize the profound negative
externalities that can be caused by lobbying.
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As shown, the Kaldor-Hicks model does not provide a sufficient method
to determine whether taxpayers should receive deductions for amounts donated to
organizations that, while seeking to promote their version of what is desirable in
society, cause harm to opposing groups. If one were to use the preliminary
principles suggested, it would support the law's current ban on deducting amounts
donated to lobbying organizations. It would, however, also suggest that the ban
should be expanded to prohibit donors from deducting amounts donated to
organizations with charitable purposes that engage in lobbying efforts.
Application of these principles also suggests that the current practice of
allowing taxpayers to deduct contributions to organizations that seek to change
public viewpoints through educational efforts is also inappropriate. Consider the
following and final scenario:
Scenario 6:~ Retumn to the less politically charged Scenario 4,
which involved groups having contradictory views regarding
hunting. Imagine that instead of directly attempting to influence
legislation, Organizations G2 and H2 attempt to change the
public's views about hunting by distributing literature and using
other information-disseminating media such as websites and emails. Organization G2 attempts to convince the public that
hunting is undesirable. Organization H2 wishes to convince the
public of the importance of hunting.
Organizations, such as those described, often exist as siblings to
organizations directly seeking to influence legislation, such as Organizations G
and H, described in Scenario 4.181 Organizations G2 and H2 wish to change the
public's opinion on a particular issue-here, hunting-in different directions
through education or proselytizing. Presumably, Organizations G2 and H2 wish to
create a "multiplier effect," whereby they would convince some individuals of
their point of view who would then continue to convince others of this perspective.
If one were to try to assess whether allowing deductions to such
organizations is appropriate under subsidy theory, the analysis would not proceed
much (if any) differently than the analysis regarding the lobbying activities
presented above. Presumably, supporters of Organization G2 would benefit when
an individual was convinced of its viewpoint, and supporters of Organization H2
would be correspondingly harmed. The opposite effect would occur if an
individual was convinced of Organization 1-2's viewpoint. Similar problems with
the Kaldor-Hicks analysis emerge (for example, if one organization has a support
base sufficiently larger than the other, a donation to the larger might be deemed
efficient and a donation to the smaller inefficient simply because of the relative
size of each group).

Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Shared Payroll Considerations in Structuring Cost181.
Sharing Arrangements, 19 TAx'N OF EXEMPTS 43, 43 (2007) ("It is common for advocacy
organizations to have several different entities in their corporate families-a 501(c)(3), a
501(c)(4), or a 501(c)(6), perhaps a PAC or another Section 527. Each raises and spends
funds according to the tax and campaign finance rules applicable to its status, but all share a
larger mission of promoting a particular issue position or set of interests.").
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Other principles must, therefore, be used. If one believes that the
government should not, through the charitable deduction, subsidize the efforts of
any particular group to advance its view of "the good" (because it will result in
disparate subsidization of opposing viewpoints), then donations made to
organizations that seek to advance one view of "the good" should not be
deductible, even if the organization does not directly attempt to influence
legislation. The law does not accord with this analysis.
Current law allows donors to deduct contributions to many organizations
that, like Organizations G2 and H2, seek to change public opinion about issues
upon which there is reasonable disagreement. For instance, the mission statement
of The National Rifle Association Foundation, Inc., a sister-organization to The
National Rifle Association (NRA), self-described as being "wiidely recognized ..
as a major political force and as America's foremost defender of Second

Amendment rights,"

8

states:

Established in 1990, The NRA Foundation, Inc. ("NRA
Foundation") is a 501 (c)(3) tax-exempt organization that raises taxdeductible contributions in support of a wide range of firearmrelated public interest activities of the National Rifle Association of
America and other organizations that defend and foster the Second
Amendment rights of all law-abiding Americans. These activities
are designed to promote firearms and hunting safety, to enhance
marksmanship skills of those participating in the shooting sports,
and to educate the general public about firearms in their historic,
technological, and artistic context. Funds granted by The NRA
Foundation benefit a variety of constituencies throughout the United
States including children, youth, women, individuals with physical
law enforcement officers, hunters, and
disabilities, gun collectors,
83
competitive shooters.'
The NRA characterized the establishment of its Foundation as a
"dramatic move" to ensure future financing in order to "provide[] a means to raise
millions of dollars to fund gun safety and educational projects of benefit to the
general public. Contributions to the 84Foundation are tax deductible and benefit a
variety of American constituencies."'
On the other side of the spectrum, the Committee to Abolish Sport
Hunting's mission statement reads:
The mission of C.A.S.H.-Committee to Abolish Sport Hunting-is
to accomplish what its name says in the shortest possible time.
Understanding that abolishing hunting entails a process, a series of
steps taken and not a single action that would effect our goal
overnight, a time frame cannot be established. We hope for building
a succession of wins, and if not wins immediately then at least a
A Brief History of the NRA, NRA, http://www.nra.org/Aboutus.aspx (last
182.
visited Aug. 31, 2010).
183.
31, 2010).

184.

About, NRA FOUND., http://www.nrafoundation.org/about/ (last visited Aug.
A BriefHistory of the NRA, supra note 182.
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succession of stirrings of consciousness. We hope to encourage
those who are still silent to speak out, awakening community after
community about the heavy hand of state and federal wildlife
management agencies. We hope to alter whatever belief still exists
that sport hunters are conservationists and champions of the
environment to a realization that they are destroyers of wildlife and
ecosystems in the narrow and broad sense. Where the natural feeling
for wildlife doesn't exist, we strive to engender among citizens
by legal hunting and that
outrage that their own rights are violated
85
their quality-of-life [is] diminished.1
C.A.S.H. is also a 501(c)(3) organization whose donors may deduct amounts
86
contributed to it.'
To further illustrate, the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation Educational

Fund is "an outgrowth of the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation,

Inc.,"'18 7

an

organization which "[t]hrough legislation, political action, education and other
legal means, . . . proclaim[s] the truth about abortion, infanticide, and
euthanasia."' 8 8 The Fund is a:
section 501(c)(3) . .. [that] has
tax-exempt organization .
undertaken projects to educate Pennsylvanians about the
personhood of children in the womb; the truth about what abortion
is and what it does to mothers and their prebomn children; the
importance of teaching teens to live a chaste life and avoid
unwanted pregnancy; and the availability of viable, life-affirming
89
alternatives to abortion, such as adoption and assisted parenting.'
.under

Advocating the opposite perspective, NARAL Pro-Choice America
Foundation, an outgrowth of NARAL Pro-Choice America, which is committed to
"protect~ing] the right to choose,"19 0 is a 50 1 (c)(3) organization able to receive taxdeductible contributions which "support[s] and protect[s], as a fundamental right
and value, a woman's freedom to make personal decisions regarding the full range
of reproductive choices through education, training, organizing, legal action, and
public policy."' 9'
Current law allows taxpayers to deduct amounts contributed to
organizations such as those discussed, often by qualifying these entities as

185.

C.A.S.H Mission Statement, CommiTrEE

To ABOLISH SPORT HUNTING,

http://www.all-creatures.org/cash/about.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).

186.
187.

Id.
Who

We

Are

and

What

We

Do,

PA.

PRO-LIFE

FED'N,

http://www.paprolife.org/about -us.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2010); see also id (noting

that the Pennsylvania Pro-Life Federation Educational Fund is a tax-exempt organization
under section 501(c)(3)).
Id
188.
189.
Id
Am.,
PRO-CHOICE
us,
NARAL
190.
About
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/about-us/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).

191.

Supporting NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation, NARAL

Am., http://www.naral.org/donate/Planned-giving/c3_planned
26, 2010).

PRO-CHOICE

giving.html (last visited Sept.
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educational or charitable organizations. Recall that donors may deduct amounts
contributed to organizations organized and operated for either of these purposes
under section 170(c).
An organization is considered educational if it performs either of two
fuinctions: "(a) The instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of
improving or developing his capabilities; or (b) The instruction of the public on
92
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community."'
An organization may qualify as an educational organization and advocate
its viewpoints so long as it does so in a manner that "presents a sufficiently full
and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to
form an independent opinion or conclusion. 19 3 An organization is not
"educational" (and donors may not deduct contributions) if "its principal function
is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion."' 9 4 A methodology test has been
developed to determine when an organization has not provided a full and fair
exposition of the facts, such that the organization may not qualify to receive
deductible contributions. The methodology test consists. of four factors, the
presence of which indicates that the expression is not a full and fair exposition:
1) The presentation of viewpoints or positions unsupported by facts
is a significant portion of the organization's communications; 2) The
facts that purport to support the viewpoints or positions are distorted;
3) The organization's presentations make substantial use of
inflammatory and disparaging terms and express conclusions more
on the basis of strong emotional feelings than of objective
evaluations; 4) The approach used in the organization's presentations
is not aimed at developing an understanding on the part of the
intended audience or readership because it does not consider their
background or training in the subject matter. '9'

192.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 2008) (setting forth
criteria for organizations to qualify' for tax-exempt status as educational organizations under
section 501(c)(3)). These requirements also determine whether taxpayers can deduct
amounts paid to these organizations. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERv., PUn. 557, TAX20 (Oct. 2010), available at
STATUS
FOR
YOUR
ORGANIZATION
EXEMPT
http://www.irs.gov/pubirs-pdf/p557.pdf ("Contributions to domestic organizations
[qualifying under section 501(c)(3)], except organizations testing for public safety, are
deductible as charitable contributions on the donor's federal income tax return."); see also
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1033 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Taxexempt status is desirable for two reasons: the profits of the exempt corporations are not
and corporations to the organization are tax deductible.")
subject to federal income tax,. ...
(citations omitted).
193.
Treas. Reg. § l.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i).
194.
Id.
Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729. The test was first set forth in National
195.
Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and subsequently published
in Rev. Proc. 86-43, 1986-2 C.B. 729. Although not binding as administrative "rules," Est.
of Lang v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 404, 406-07 & n.4 (1975), Revenue Procedures constitute
official statements of IRS procedure. Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814. Further, courts
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Thus, so long as organizations such as those described above promote their
viewpoints within these limitations, taxpayers may deduct amounts donated to
them.
Organizations attempting to change public opinion may also receive taxdeductible contributions by qualifying as "charitable" organizations. Relevant
regulations state that:
The fact that an organization, in carrying out its primary purpose,
advocates social or civic changes or presents opinion on
controversial issues with the intention of molding public opinion or
creating public sentiment to an acceptance of its views does not
preclude such organization from qualifying under section 501(c)(3)
[to receive tax-deductible contributions] so long as it is not an action

organization. . ..

9

An organization may be considered an action organization (not able to
receive deductible contributions) if it "fails" any of three tests. First, an
organization is an action organization "if a substantial part of its activities is
attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise. "19 Second, an
organization is an action organization if it "participates or intervenes, directly or
indirectly, in any political campaign on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate
for public office."19 8 Third, an organization is an action organization:
if it has the following two characteristics: (a) Its main or primary
objective or objectives (as distinguished from its incidental or
secondary objectives) may be attained only by legislation or a defeat
of proposed legislation; and (b) it advocates, or campaigns for, the
attainment of such main or primary objective or objectives. .. .'9
So long as organizations such as those described seek to change public
viewpoints without seeking to influence legislation, they may also be able to
receive deductible contributions by qualifying as charitable organizations.
Consideration of the second principle suggests that donors should not be
able to deduct contributions made to those organizations that seek to promote
particular viewpoints on issues upon which there is reasonable disagreement,
regardless of whether these tests are fulfilled. Allowing the deduction runs afoul of
the notion that the government should not subsidize one version of "the good" over
others and results in the disparate subsidization of certain viewpoints over others,
often in favor of organizations with the largest support bases. This suggests
another place in which the current law should be reformed.
have tended to follow the methodology test, and the IRS has continued to use it. See, e.g.,
Nationalist Movement v. Comm'r, 37 F.3d 216, 218 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994).
196.
Treas. Reg. § 1.50 1(c)(3)-1(d)(2). The Internal Revenue Code provides that
even an organization with a qualifying purpose (such as a charitable organization), I.R.C. §§
501 (c)(3), 170(c)(2)(B), cannot receive deductible contributions if it is disqualified from
tax-exempt status "by reason of attempting to influence legislation," Id § 170(c)(2)(D). The
regulations, in turn, explain when this disqualification will occur.
197.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(ii).
198.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii).
199.
Treas. Reg. § 1.50 l(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iv).
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CONCLUSION
Despite its longevity, the rationale for the charitable deduction is the
subject of continuing debate. Subsidy theory is one of the most often utilized
theories for determining circumstances in which a deduction is needed to
encourage giving that would not occur in its absence.
But subsidy theory, along with other scholarly theories, has failed to
recognize that, while charitable organizations may very well produce positive
externalities, they may also cause negative externalities of various types and
magnitudes. This Article recognizes this important fact and illustrates how an
application of the Kaldor-Hicks model to transfers creating negative externalities
yields inappropriate and unhelpful results for analyzing whether a charitable
deduction is warranted.
Specifically, when negative externalities are limited to those assumed by
subsidy theorists-when the only harm caused by a transfer is universal
subsidization harm and slight psychic harms-it is generally easy for donations to
be deemed efficient under the Kaldor-Hicks model. However, as negative
externalities become severe, it is clear that the Kaldor-Hicks model cannot serve
as a complete method for separating transfers that should and should not receive a
charitable deduction.
In order to fill this gap, other factors must be considered. This Article
offers two preliminary principles to evaluate situations where charities create these
more serious negative externalities. These principles are offered as a starting point
for discussion and are by no means meant to provide an exhaustive answer to the
difficult problem of subsidy theory, and other theories, failing to adequately
account for negative externalities.
First, after recognizing that the Kaldor-Hicks model might allow
taxpayers to deduct amounts donated to organizations that cause extremely
profound harms, such as harms caused by exclusion policies, this Article suggests
that there should be a limit to the types of harm that the government can subsidize.
Thus, the first principle suggests that the government should not subsidize
organizations that impinge on an individual's ability to live a full and meaningful
life as a fair and equal member of society. Taxpayers should not be able to deduct
amounts donated to organizations that curtail one's ability to so live. This suggests
that the current practice of allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts donated to
organizations with certain exclusion policies is inappropriate.
Second, this Article illustrates that the Kaldor-Hicks model cannot serve
as a sufficient method for determining whether taxpayers should be able to deduct
amounts donated to organizations that seek to promote opposing viewpoints on
issues upon which there is reasonable disagreement. The second principle offered
to fill this gap is rooted in the belief that the government should not support one
reasonable conception of "the good" over any other.200 If accepted, the government
should not subsidize (through a charitable deduction) organizations advancing any
particular viewpoint. Allowing taxpayers to deduct amounts contributed to these
200.

RAWLS, supra note 16, at 138.
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organizations would result in disparate subsidization of different "sides" of societal
debates, often favoring larger groups.
The law currently does not allow donors to deduct amounts donated to
lobbying organizations that seek to influence legislation. This accords with the
second principle. The second principle also suggests, however, that the ban should
be expanded. Current law inappropriately allows deductions for donations made to
certain 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in lobbying efforts, so long as their
lobbying is sufficiently limited. This runs afoul of the principle that the
government should not subsidize efforts to promote any version of "the good."
These organizations should segregate funds, and donors should only be able to
deduct amounts used to further charitable purposes. The second principle also
suggests that the law inappropriately allows donors to deduct amounts contributed
to organizations, often siblings of lobbying groups, which do not directly seek to
influence legislation but seek to educate or proselytize their viewpoints.
Subsidy theory provides a useful starting point for limiting the charitable
deduction. However, along with other theories analyzing the deduction, it has
routinely failed to consider cases where donations are made to organizations
which, in addition to creating positive externalities, also create negative
externalities. The suggested principles presented act as a starting point to fill this
gap and will, hopefully, create further discourse about whether and to what extent
taxpayers should be able to deduct amounts donated to "charities" that cause harm.

